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THE PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF SECURITIES
BROKERS UNDER FEDERAL LAW: AN ANTIDOTE FOR
BUBBLES?
Steven A. Ramirez*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great
Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed legislation
specifically designed to extend greater protection to the investing public
and to elevate business practices within the securities brokerage
industry.' This legislative initiative ultimately gave birth to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the '34 Act).' The '34 Act represented
the first large scale regulation of the nation's public securities markets.
Up until that time, the securities brokerage industry4 had been left to
regulate itself (through various private stock exchanges). This system of
* Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. Professor William Rich caused me to
write this Article by arranging a Faculty Scholarship Forum at Washburn University in the'Spring of 2001
and asking me to participate. He has been a constant positive influence in my efforts to improve as a scholar.
My excellent former secretary Mary Beth Bero has also been a consistently positive factor in helping me be
a productive scholar.
1. The background of the President's [initiative] is only too familiar to everyone. During
the post-war decade some 50 billions of new securities were floated in the United States.
Fully halfor $25,000,000,000 worth of securities floated during this period have been proved
to be worthless. These cold figures spell tragedy in the lives of thousands of individuals who
invested their life savings, accumulated after years of effort, in these worthless securities. The

flotation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities was made possible because of the
complete abandonment by many underwriters and dealers in securities of those standards of
fair, honest, and prudent dealing that should be basic to the encouragement of investment
in any enterprise. Alluring promises ofeasy wealth were freely made with little or no attempt
to bring to the investor's attention those facts essential to estimating the worth of any security.
High-pressure salesmanship rather than careful counsel was the rule in this most dangerous
of enterprises.
H.R.REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
7
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404,48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 13 U.S.C. §§ 8a78mm (2000)).
3. HOWELL E.JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONSJR.,REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
653 (1999). Some state regulation ofthe securities markets and the securities brokerage industry was in place
in 1934, but for a variety of reasons it was of limited effectiveness. Id. at 656. For example, states had
inadequate resources for expert regulatory staff, and a lack of uniformity created opportunities for regulatory
competition and avoidance whereby business could gravitate towards laxjurisdictions. Id.
4. The '34 Act regulates both "brokers" and "'dealers." A broker is defined as "any person engaged
in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account ofothers." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2000).
A dealer is defined as "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own
account, through a broker or otherwise." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (2000). This paper refers to both of these
types of entities under the terms "broker-dealer" or "securities brokerage industry."
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self-regulation had the benefit of being expertly promulgated, administered, and enforced, but it lacked government sanctioning power. In
addition, because the professional standards were set by the profession
itself, the regulations were susceptible to dilution? Because the industry's unassisted efforts at self-regulation had failed so spectacularly,6 the
'34 Act was aimed at preserving self-regulation within a legal framework
that assured the enforcement of higher industry standards.7 The '34
Act, therefore, empowers self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to wield
initial regulatory authority, subject to the federal oversight of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).8 The '34 Act thus effectively preserved self-regulation while at the same time mandating "just
and equitable principles of trade" in the securities brokerage industry
with the specific intent of raising industry standards for the protection
of investors. 9 This was a key element of the New Deal effort to
reconstruct
investor confidence and restore macroeconomic stability and
0
growth. 1
5. SeeJACKSON & SYMONS, supra note 3, at 659 (discussing how the New Deal transformed private
regulation to "quasi-public". self-regulation). See also U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OFTHE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 REGARDING THE

NASD ANDTHENASDAQMARKET 7 (1996) (discussing the benefits of self-regulation and the risk that selfregu!ation may favor industry interests over those of investors) [hereinafter SEC REPORT].
6. "One would have to turn the pages of history back to the days of the South Sea bubble to find
an equivalent fantasy ofsecurity selling." H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 3.
7. See SEC v. Zandford, 122 S. Ct. 1899, 1903(2002) ("Among Congress' objectives in passing the
Act was 'to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence' after the market crash
of 1929."); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) (stating that the
"primary objective of the federal securities laws" is investor protection through promotion of a "high
standard of business ethics" in "every facet of the securities industry") (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963)); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. Unites States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972) (noting that the intent of the '34 Act was to "'achieve a high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry' and that the Act must consequently "be construed ... flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes") (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186, 195 (1963)); Silver v. N.Y.
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,366 (963) ("It requires but little appreciation of... what happened in ... the
1920's and 1930's to realize how essential it is that the highest ethical standards prevail as to every aspect
of the [securities business].").
8. Compare 1 U.S.C. § 78f (2000) (delineating'powers of exchanges) and 1 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000)
(delineating powers of National Association of Securities Dealers, the only registered securities association),
with 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000) (specifying oversight powers of the SEC). See also WILUAM 0. DOUGLAS,
DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 64-65, 82 (1940) (stating that stock exchanges are the "scales upon which that
great national resource, invested capital, is weighed"; therefore, they may not be allowed to be run as
"private club[s]" and instead government must exercise a "residual role" and "keep the shotgun, so to speak,
behind the door, loaded, well-oiled, cleaned and ready for use"). Justice Douglas served as Chairman of the
SEC during the'1930s. Id. at viii.
9. See15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(5) (2000) (requiring rules of SROs to "protect inestors and the public
interest").
10. "This proposal... puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus
to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence." H.R. REP. NO. 73-83, at 2
(quoting letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt). The Great Depression demolished investor confidence
so thoroughly that investors had "grown timid to the point of hoarding" cash. This breakdown in free,
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Since 1934, however, the courts have largely ignored the logical
implications of this New Deal initiative to elevate standards of conduct
within the securities industry and insure investor protection when
assessing the duties of broker-dealers to customers. Instead, the courts
essentially allow federal law to define federal securities fraud claims and
look exclusively to state law for non-fraud claims. This result is in large
part the responsibility of counsel who have represented investors against
securities professionals. For the most part, the theories advanced to
invoke federal protections have been stilted and have allowed courts to
fail to fully appreciate the policy foundations of the '34 Act and the
nature of the professional obligations imposed under the Act, particularly as amended in 1938, 1964, and 1975. Rather, courts have blithely
assumed, on a vast majority of occasions, that except in cases of fraud,
state law principles of fiduciary duties are the exclusive source of brokerdealer obligations in a private suit to recover monetary damages.
Moreover, academic commentators have failed to devote much thought
to how the federal oversight of self-regulation fits with remedies for
broker-dealer misconduct." Fundamentally, the '34 Act embodied a
legislative compromise whereby federal law would elevate industry
standards while preserving self-regulation so long as that compromise
would secure the transcendent goalofinvestor protection.12 This Article
consequently posits that the '34 Act (particularly as amended in subsequent years) effectively mandates minimum standards of professional
conduct (giving rise to state law remedies) without interfering with state
fiduciary duty law and without creating an entire new class of federal

unregulated securities markets posed a historic threat to "honest enterprise" and capitalism generally.
S. REP. 73-47, at 1 (1933).
11. SeeCheryl Goss Weiss, A Review of the Historic Foudationsof Broker-DealerLiability for Breach of
Fiducimy Duy, 23J. CORP. L. 65, 119 (1997) (stating that "key issue" to fiduciary obligation is "control");
Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1272-73 (1995) (contending
that the shingle theory, discussed infra note 105, is no longer a sound basis for civil liability under the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws); Gregory A. Hicks, Defining the Scope of Broker and Dealer
Duties-Some Problems in Adjudicating the Responsibilities of Securities and Conunodities Professiona. 39 DEPAUL L.
REV. 709, 713 (1990) (arguing that fiduciary duty concepts may saddle market professionals with
"extravagant" duties that have "unpersuasive" foundations that are untethered to industry understandings
and practices); Carol R. Goforth, Stockbrokers' Duties to their Customers, 33 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 407 (1989)
(reviewing common law of broker liability with little analysis of role of SRO rules in supporting professional
liability); Robert H. Mundheim, ProfessionalResposiu"iesofBroker-Deakrs: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE
LJ. 445 (1965) (discussing industry professional obligations but failing to assess the extent to which such
standards support professional liability).
12. "The bill proceeds on the theory that the exchanges are pub lic institutions ... and are not private
clubs to be conducted only in accordance with the interests of their members." H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at
15(1934).
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remedies, claims, and law. In essence, federal law supports state law
3
claims for broker malpractice or professional liability.'
In the decades following the '34 Act, the fact that the courts failed to
fully appreciate the significance of the Act mattered little; state law
fiduciary principles generally supported broker liability on a basis similar
to the industry standards required under the '34 Act. In addition, Rule
l0b-514was broadly interpreted to extend remedies to investors harmed
by misconduct. However, a growing body of state-based case law has
narrowed broker-dealer fiduciary obligations. Thus, in the wake of the
fading memory of the Great Depression, state law has developed
unevenly, with a number of courts wandering into a decisively caveat
emptor mode, as if the Great Depression and the '34 Act had never
occurred.13 Meanwhile, in the federal courts, the New Deal remedies

13. Of the scores of reported broker liability cases, few even discuss broker liability in terms of
malpractice or professional liability. See Ferritto v. Olde & Co., 577 N.E.2d 101, 104 (Ohio App. 1989)
(affirmingjury verdict for broker's negligent violation of the New York Stock Exchange's (NYSE) Business
Conduct Rule 405, which requires brokers to "learn the essential facts relative to every customer" and "every
order"); Twomey v. Mitchum Jones & Templeton, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 244 (1968) (stating that "ethical
standards" can form the basis for civil liability for negligence even if such violations are unsupported by an
express or implied right of action under federal law); McCollum v. Billings, 279 N.Y.S.2d 609, 616-617
(1967) (finding the claim that the broker "failed to exercise their special skill and competence" invoked
jurisdiction of state court for redress under state law).
The Twomey court did not address explicitly whether its substantive basis for liability rested upon
fiduciary duty concepts or professional malpractice. See i. at 227. 28. The opinion is premised on the term
"misfeasance," which is consistent with professional malpractice as well as breach of fiduciary duty. See id.
at 227. Similarly, the Ferrittocourt applied concepts of professional negligence in the context of a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty. 577 N.E.2d at 585.
14. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. 240, 1Ob-5 (2001). As such, Rule lOb-5 is the general anti-fraud provision of the federal securities
laws.
15. Ferdinand Pecora served for seventeen months, fromJanuary 1933 toJuly 1934, as counsel to
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency during the time of hearings on the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act. SeeFERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH: THE STORY OF OUR MODERN
MONEY CHANGERS 3 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1973) (1939). Pecora published a summary of those
congressional hearings because "[aifter five short years, we may now need to be reminded what Wall Street
was like before Uncle Sam stationed a policeman at its corner." Id. at xi.
Pecora was prescient in predicting a failure of public memory:
Under the surface of the governmental regulation of the securities market, the same forces
that produced the riotous speculative excesses of the "wild bull market" of 1929 still give
evidences of their existence and influence. Though repressed for the present, it cannot be
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in favor of investors have generally been reversed so that federal law
now provides remedies that are more restrictive than those available
under state law. 6 For the first few decades after the New Deal, then, it
mattered little whether the professional liability of brokers was given
effect, as other equally generous means of recovery were available. 7
Today, however, fiduciary concepts and private securities litigation have
contracted to such a point that broker liability is now best based upon
federally mandated industry standards and traditional state claims of
professional liability, such as malpractice. Most important, there are
compelling policy reasons for courts to give effect to these standards: the
economic imperatives of stemming speculative bubbles and an erosion
in professional conduct. Recognition of professional standards can
thereby avoid another meltdown in investor confidence like that which
occurred in 1929 and which seems to be recurring in 2002 in the wake
of relaxed standards of conduct for securities brokers.
This Article does not posit that the '34 Act provided for federal
fiduciary standards preemptive of state fiduciary duties, or even for
federal private rights of action against broker-dealers for violation of
industry standards.' Rather, the Act preserved industry self-regulation

doubted that, given a suitable opportunity, they would spring back into pernicious activity.
Frequently we are told that this regulation has been throttling the country's prosperity.
Bitterly hostile was Wall Street to the enactment of the regulatory legislation. It now looks
forward to the day when it shall, as it hopes, reassume the reins of its former power...
The public, however, is sometimes forgetful. As its memory of the unhappy market collapse
of 1929 becomes blurred, it may lend at least one ear to the persuasive voices of The Street
subtly pleading for a return to the "good old times." Forgotten, perhaps, by some are the
shattering revelations of the Senate Committee's investigation ....
Id. at ix-x.
16. See,e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Privat
Securties Litgaton: Dealing with the

Menorims as well as the Frvolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.. 1055, 1059 (1999) (noting that Congressional
"reforms" in private securities litigation during the 1990s had the perverse effect of using federal law to
narrow investor rights).
17. The '34 Act regulates both broker-dealers as well as individuals working for broker-dealers, under
the term "person [s] associated with a broker or dealer."
The term "person associated with a broker or dealer" or "associated person of a broker or
dealer" means any partner, officer, director, or branch manager of such broker or dealer (or
any person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions), any person directly
or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with such brokeror dealer,
or any employee of such broker or dealer, except that any person associated with a broker
or dealer whose functions are solely clerical or ministerial shall not be included in the
meaning of such term ....
15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(18) (2000). Thus, for purposes ofthis article the term "brokers" or "broker-dealers" refers
to individuals as well as firms.
18. Given the breadth of the '34 Act, which regulates everything from insider trading to public
company diselosure obligations, and the reach of the New Deal generally, which regulates everything from
deposit insurance to monetary policy, such far-reaching and intrusive regulation would have been politically
problematic.
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while mandating high industry standards of professional conduct with
powerful enforcement mechanisms. Congress and President Roosevelt
specifically intended these mandated self-regulatory standards to operate
to protect investors, but to do so outside of an express federal remedial
scheme. The most logical result is the imposition of federally mandated
industry standards that operate to give investors contract and professional negligence remedies in accordance with state law.
This Article shows that under the '34 Act, federal law imposes
minimum professional obligations upon securities broker-dealers that
should operate to benefit and protect investors by, among other things,
providing monetary damages to investors harmed by professional
misconduct. Part II of the Article reviews in detail the content, scope,
and source of these federally mandated standards of professional
conduct. Integral to this review is an analysis of the history of the
federal regulatory regime of the securities brokerage industry. Part III
of this Article attempts to account for more than sixty-five years of
common law development of the professional obligations of securities
professionals. For the most part, these common law obligations have
diverged from the federally imposed regime, especially as the lessons of
the Great Depression have faded. Part IV assesses the risks of allowing
professional standards to meander lower, as has been the trend in the
courts. The Article concludes that the recent dilution of investor
remedies originally contemplated by the drafters of the '34 Act risks
excessive speculation, reduced investor confidence, and the continued
erosion of the market niche of professional broker-dealers. In the end,
this Article seeks to demonstrate that high standards of professional
conduct, enforceable by aggrieved investors, will stabilize financial
markets as well as the business of providing professional broker-dealer
services.
II. FEDERAL PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS FOR SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS

A paramount goal of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
embodied in the legislation's conference committee report, was to
"prevent inequitable and unfair practices" on securities exchanges.' 9
This Part will show that this fundamental goal has given rise to a
persistent effort to professionalize the securities brokerage industry.
This effort has led to standards of conduct that should operate to benefit

19. E.g., S. REP. No. 73-185, at 1 (1934) (conference report on final bill).
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and protect investors harmed by brokers' misconduct, including
supporting state law claims for traditional professional negligence.20
A. The Leislative and PoliticalHistoy of the '34Act
The ultimate political source of the New Deal regulatory initiativesincluding the regulation of securities-was President Franklin D.
Roosevelt.2 ' President Roosevelt was quite clear about the purposes of
the Securities Act of 193322 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.23

He viewed these legislative initiatives as a seamless effort24 to raise the
standards of conduct across the entire securities business and to replace
20. Neither by the Securities Act of 1933 nor by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does
the Federal Government undertake to approve or guarantee the present soundness or the
future value of any security. The investor must still, in the final analysis, select the security
which he deems appropriate for investment. The purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 are
to make available to him complete and truthful information from which he may intelligently
appraise the value of a security, and to safeguard against the negligent and fraudulent
practices perpetrated upon him in the past by incompetent and unscrupulous bankers,
underwriters, dealers and issuers.
S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 153 (1934).
21. For example, in addition to the usual legislative process, President Roosevelt directed the
Secretary of Commerce to form a committee to study the problems inherent*in federal regulation of the
securities markets. The result of this study was transmitted by the President to Congress and became the
basis of the '34 Act. See REPORT TO THE SEC'Y OF COMMERCE BY THE COMM. ON STOCK EXCH.
REGULATION, reprintedin SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 73D CONG., 2D SEss., LETER
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMM. ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY WITH AN ACCOMPANYING REPORT RELATIVE TO STOCK EXCH. REGULATION, reprinted in 5
LEGISLAI'IVEHISTORY OFTHESECURITIESACTOF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGEACTOF 1934, Item
16, at III (Comm. Print 1934) J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahareds., 1973) [hereinafter STOCKEXCHANGE
REGULATION STUDY].
22. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38,48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (2000)).
23. Supra note 2.
24. S. REP. No. 73-792, at 1 (1934) (stating that the '33 Act was "one step" in our "broad purpose
of protecting investors") (quoting letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt). Congress also viewed the
various New Deal initiatives aimed at restructuring our system of financial regulation as an integrated effort
to address the same complex of problems:
In the course of the investigation thus far conducted by the subcommittee a record of more
than 12,000 printed pages has been compiled and more than 1,000 exhibits received in
evidence. The subcommittee has endeavored to investigate thoroughly and impartially some
of the complex and manifold ramifications of the business of issuing, offering, and selling
securities and the business of banking and extending credit. It has endeavored to expose
banking operations and practices deemed detrimental to the public welfare; to reveal
unsavory and unethical methods employed in the flotation and sale of securities; and to
disclose devices whereby income-tax liability is avoided or evaded. Its purpose throughout
has been to lay the foundation for remedial legislation in the fields explored and in some
measure that purpose has already been achieved. During the progress of this investigation,
Congress enacted the Banking Act of 1933, the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and several amendments to the revenue act calculated to eliminate
methods of tax avoidance described before the subcommittee.
S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 3-4 (1934).
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the principle of caveat emptor23 with a "clearer understanding of the
ancient truth" that those managing "other people's money" should be
subject to trustee duties. 6 Focusing specifically upon the regulation of
the securities broker-dealer profession, Roosevelt stated that his
legislative proposal was animated by a "broad purpose of protecting
investors" and to provide for "better supervision" of securities exchanges.17 The goal of the Act was therefore to establish "a minimum
standard of fair dealing" on securities exchanges.2 The '34 Act was
essentially an attempt to make capitalism more durable by making
"intelligent adjustments," rather than an attempt to "destroy" the
market mechanism for allocation of capital.2 9 Thus, for example, the
'34 Act focuses upon disclosure obligations rather than having the
government approve securities for sale to the public."
The legislative history of the securities acts evinces an intent that is
entirely consistent with President Roosevelt's goal of elevating standards
within the securities profession. 3' The House Report accompanying the

25. "This proposal adds to the ancient rule caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let the seller also
beware.' It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller." H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (quoting
letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
26. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933). See alsoJACKSON & SYMONS, supra note 3, at 659 ("While
it had a profound effect on capital formation, the 1933 Act was recognized from the start as simply the first
phase of federal regulation over the securities industry.").
27. H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 1 (1934) (quoting letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
28. STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION STUDY, supra note 21, at v. Roosevelt was modeling his
securities initiatives on Louis Brandeis's landmark work, Other People's Money, which posited that investment
professionals should be subject to duties akin to a "trustee." SeeLouis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 199-200 (1911). See also generalo SHELDON M.JAFFE, BROKERDEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS § 1.03 (1977).
29. The bill is conceived in a spirit of the truest conservatism. It attempts to change the
practices of exchanges and the relationships between listed corporations and the investing
public to fit modem conditions, for the very purpose that they may endure as essential
elements ofour economic system. The lesson of 1921-29 is that without changes they cannot
endure.
The bill is not a moral pose or a vengeful striking back at brokers for the losses which
nearly the entire Nation has suffered in the last 5 years. Nor is its purpose or effect to
regiment business in any way. It is simply an earnest attempt to make belated intelligent
adjustments, long required by changing conditions, in a faulty system . . . which from the
coldly objective viewpoint of the welfare of a conservative public simply has not worked.
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 3.
30. %e S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 13(1934).
31. Indeed, section 2 of the '34 Act articulates many broad and important policy reasons for
regulation, all of which militate for the abolition ofcaveatemptorand the creation of"fair and honest" markets:
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as commonly conducted
upon securities exchanges and over-theacounter markets are affected with a national public
interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions
and ofpractices and matters related thereto, including transactions by officers, directors, and
principal security holders, to require appropriate reports to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for securities and a national system for
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'34 Act plainly states that "constant extension of the legal conception of
a fiduciary relationship-a guarantee of 'straight shooting' is required
to "support[ ] the constant extension of ... confidence which is the

foundation of a maturing and complicated economic system." 32 The '34
Act therefore "proceeds on the theory that the exchanges are public
institutions" and "not private clubs to be conducted only in accordance
with the interests of their members."33 Consequently, the Securities and
Exchange Commission was "empowered" to impose appropriate rules
for "the protection of investors" and "to insure fair dealing." 4 Still,
Congress hoped that the bill would give exchanges the power to reform
themselves and that Commission actionwould not be needed.35 These
precepts form the foundation upon which the modern mandatory selfregulatory regime is built.
This self-regulatory regime came about because the securities industry
was able to launch a substantial attack upon any effort to displace
industry self-regulation with a federalized, transcendent fiduciary
principle or an effort for detailed statutory standards of conduct.36 The
"central compromise" of the '34 Act was to implement a scheme of
"cooperative regulation" instead of fully federalized regulation. 7 This
the clearance and settlement of securities transactions and the safeguarding of securities and
funds related thereto, and to impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and
control reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect interstate commerce, the
national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national
banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and
honest markets in such transactions.

15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000).
32. H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 5.
Unless constant extension of the legal conception of a fiduciary relationship--a guarantee of
"straight shooting"--supports the constant extension of mutual confidence which is the
foundation of a maturing and complicated economic system, easy liquidity of the resources
in which wealth is invested is a danger rather than a prop to the stability of that system.
When everything everyone owns can be sold at once, there must be confidence not to sell.
Just in proportion as it becomes more liquid and complicated, an economic system must
become more moderate, more honest, and more justifiably self-trusting.
Id.
33. Id. at 15.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. The original bill submitted to the Committee dealt very specifically and definitely with
a number of admitted abuses. In many cases, however, the argument was made that while
the solutions offered might be correct, their effects were so far-reaching as to make it
inadvisable to put these solutions in the form of statutory enactments that could not be
changed in case of need without Congressional action. Representatives of the stock
exchanges constantly urged a greater degree of flexibility in the statute and insisted that the
complicated nature of the problemsjustified leaving much greater latitude of discretion with
the administrative agencies than would otherwise be the case.
Id. at 6.
37. JACKSON & SYMONS, supra note 3, at 659-62; JAFFE,.supra note 28,.§ 1.04.
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compromise had a sound basis in policy. First, the compromise gave
recognition to the fact that the brokerage industry is complex and often
in need of flexible and swift regulatory action. '3 Second, the exchanges
had a history of some level of self-regulation.39 Third, the use of selfregulation lowers the expenses of regulation and dispenses with the need
for vast bureaucracies.' Finally, self-regulation can impose ethical
standards beyond minimum legal requirements. 4 The mandatory selfregulation compromise thus reflected the hope that "well-managed
exchanges" would have the power under the '34 Act to raise industry
standards.42
In 1938, Congress took another step in professionalizing the securities
brokerage industry when it passed the Maloney Act, 43 which expanded
the SEC's authority into the over-the-counter securities market by
expanding the concept of self-regulation beyond just broker-dealers that
were exchange members. Congress intended the Maloney Act to stem
unethical conduct (and insist upon "professional conduct") that, "while
technically outside of the area of definite illegality," would nevertheless
prove harmful to "customer and to decent competitor" alike. 4 This

38. Stock exchanges raise essentially new problems in Federal regulation. They do not
present a static situation susceptible to fixed standards. On the contrary, it is a highly
dynamic, ever-changing picture, subject to untold and unknown possibilities and
combinations that are today unpredictable. The thing to be avoided is the placing of this

complex and important mechanism in a straitjacket.
Your committee has considered as an alternative suggestion that the proposed
enactment cover in its detailed provisions all known unfair, inequitable, and unsocial
practices by express provisions with a minimum discretionary power of regulation by the
governmental body responsible for enforcement;
While it is possible to fix by law certain basic standards as a guide to conduct in the
matter of regulation of exchanges, these must be limited to minimum requirements. The
point specifically is that while certain provisions might be included in any regulations, such
provisions should not be the only power of correction left open to an administrative agency,
but it should have broad discretion to operate directly on various abuses as the future may
prove them to exist. It is not proposed that the Government so dominate exchanges as to
deprive these organizations of initiative and responsibility, but it is proposed to provide
authority to move quickly and to the point when the necessity arises.
STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION STUDY, supra note 21, at 6.
39. JAFFE, supra note 28, § 1.04.
40. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
41. Id. See alss S. REP. No. 88-379, at 42 (1963) (stating that self-regulation allows regulation of "unethical as distinct from illegal conduct").
42. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 15.
43. Maloney Act, Pub. L. No. 719, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938).
44. S. REP. No. 75-1455, at 3 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 75-2307, at 4 (1938). The 75th Congress
articulated the problem with direct government regulation ofindustry norms when it compared the Maloney
Act with a "second" option of "cooperative regulation":
The first would involve a pronounced expansion , .. of the [SEC]; the multiplication of
branch offices; a large increase in the expenditure of public funds; an increase of the
problem of avoiding the evils of bureaucracy; and a minute, detailed, and rigid regulation
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theme of protecting "decent competitor [s] "was notjust hollow rhetoric,
as securities brokerage industry trade groups sponsored and supported
the Maloney Act.4 5 Ultimately, the Maloney Act gave rise to the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the NASD), the only
"Securities Association" ever registered pursuant to section 15A of the
'34 Act.4 As the NASD puts it, it "is not an organization that was
imposed upon the investment banking and securities business by
Congress.... The privilege of self-regulation was actively sought by
the securities business....." 47 Virtually every registered broker-dealer
is now required to be a member of the NASD. 4 . The effect of the
NASD is to nationalize the standards of professional conduct applicable
to broker-dealers.49
In 1964, Congress acted again to further professionalize the securities
brokerage industry and raise business standards.5 ° The premise of the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1.964 (the '64 Amendments) 5 1was to give
specificity to the '34 Act's "general objective" of protecting "investors
against malpractices in the securities and financial markets."52 In fact,
Congress determined that further action was required because of "the
reliance which the investing public necessarily places upon the compe53
tence and character of professionals" in the securities markets.
Congress found that "inexperienced or unqualified persons" subjected
the "investing public to undue hazards.' 54 To remedy perceived
shortcomings in the then existing statutory scheme, Congress drafted
section 15(b)(7), 55 which required the NASD to promulgate rules
mandating that any person associated with a member broker-dealer
meet standards of "training, experience,.., and such other qualifica-

of business conduct by law. It might very well mean expanding the present process of
registration . . . to include the proscription not only of the dishonest, but also of those
unwilling or unable to conform to rigid standards of... professional conduct ....
S. REP. No.75-1455, at 3-4; H.R. REP. NO. 75-2307, at 4-5.
45. VI Louis Loss &JOELSELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2789-90 (1990).

46. JACKSON & SYMONS, supra note 3, at 662.
47. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., MANUAL 160 (2000) [hereinafter
NASD MANUAL]. According to the NASD, "[w]ithout legislative authority, ., the problem of effectively
promoting self-regulation was a difficult one." Id. at 159.
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) & (9) (2000).
49. SeeS. REP. No. 88-379, at 42 (1963) ("In the light of... the desirability of uniform application
of standards," it would be "anomalous" to allow membership in SROs to be optional).
50. SeeSecurities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565.
51. Id.
52. H.R. REP. NO. 88-1418, at 4 (1964).
53. S.REP. NO. 88-379, at 43.
54. Id.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (2000).
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tions" as the NASD may prescribe.56 This legislation was enacted in
response to an SEC Special Study of the Securities Markets completed
in 1963.57 A consistent theme of the Special Study underlying the
promulgation of the '64 Amendments was the SEC's stated need to
upgrade industry standards 58 and to further professionalize the brokerage industry.59 In line with this theme, the Commission recommended
competency standards and character and fitness standards as in "the
legal profession."6 " Ultimately, the industry, through the NASD,
adopted rigorous standards of character and fitness requiring that
members and associated persons be "capable of complying with" all
laws and regulations and of "observing high standards of commercial
honor and just and equitable principles of trade."61 It is notable that the
securities industry itself was virtually unanimous in its support of this
regulatory initiative to strengthen the hand of the SEC in imposing
higher industry standards.62 After the '64 Amendments, standards of
upon all brokerprofessional competence and integrity were imposed
63
Study.
Special
the
by
dealers as recommended
In 1975, Congress again acted to give more power to the SEC to
enforce industry standards. First, the SEC was given power to directly
enforce SRO rules and regulations.64 Second, the Commission was
given enhanced authority to disapprove changes in an exchange's rules

56. Id.
57. See REPORT OFSPECIALSTUDY OFSECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 1,at 151
(1st Sess. 1963) [hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY]. The Special Study was authorized by Congress in order to
assess any inadequacies in the regulation of the securities brokerage industry. Id. at 1. Congress was
concerned that speculative excesses had once again permeated the nation's securities exchanges and wanted
to assure the maintenance of investor confidence. id. at 1-2.
58. As the SEC stated: "The functions ofthis report and ofany changes proposed are to strengthen
the mechanisms facilitating the free flow of capital into the markets and to raise standards of investor
protection, thus preserving and enhancing the level of investor confidence." Id. at v (letter of transmittal
dated Aug. 8, 1963).
59. Graham L. Sterling, Jr., National Association of Securities Dealers and the Securities Acts Anendments of
1964, 20 BUS. LAW. 313 (1965) ("A consistent theme of the Special Study is the professionalization or
upgrading of the industry."). Congress stated that one of the "major subjects" of the '64 Amendments was
to "strengthen qualification standards and disciplinary controls" over securities industry personnel. H.R.
REP. No. 88-1418, at 2 (1964). Congress specifically intended the '64 Amendments to impose standards of
"training, experience and competence" for securities industry personnel. Id.
60. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 57, at 161.
61. NASD MANUAL, supra note 47, Rule 1014(a)(3), at 3120.
62. See H.R.REP. No.88-1418, at 3 (1964).
63. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 57, at 159-61. It is significant that Congress in 1964 recognized the
intent to protect investors from "malpractices" in the securities markets. Supra note 50. Malpractice is a term
that has long been associated with professional liability for negligence. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 971 (7th
ed. 1999) (defining malpractice to mean "[a]n instance of negligence or incompetence on the part of a
professional"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1111 (4th rev. ed. 1968) (citing Gregory v. McGinnis, 134
S.E. 527, 529 (S.C. 1926)).
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(l) (2000).

HeinOnline -- 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 538 2001-2002

2002]

STOCKBROKER MALPRACTICE

539

and to review disciplinary actions taken by an exchange so as to provide
for more uniform sanctions and standards.65 As part of this effort,
Congress in 1975 reviewed the history of mandatory self-regulation and
made many statements that bore directly upon the issue of the intent of
the '34 Act. The 94th Congress stated that the 73d Congress opted to
allow self-regulation to continue to "govern the conduct and professional
standards of professional participants in the securities markets."66 The
94th Congress also recognized that "the SEC is charged with supervising the exercise of this regulatory power in order to assure that it is used
...
to protect investors and assure fair dealing in securities."67
Finally, in 1995, Congress overhauled private litigation under the
federal securities laws. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA)68 stemmed from an attitude in the courts as well as in
Congress (eager to respond to industry clamor) that private securities
litigation is often "vexatious. 6 9 While the PSLRA raised the bar
dramatically on plaintiff claims, Congress did not change the ability of
the SEC to mandate industry standards in the securities industry, did
not alter the method or procedure by which customer broker disputes
were arbitrated, and evinced no intent to allow enforcement means
other than private statutory claims to be diluted. The PSLRA demonstrates that both the industry and Congress remain as committed as ever
to the SEC's ongoing role of imposing professional standards in lieu of
caveat emptor in the securities industry.
Viewing the legislative history of the '34 Act, as well as the legislative
history of the major amendments promulgated by Congress subsequent
to 1934, certain elements of consistent legislative and political intent
65. See15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) & (c) (2000).
66. In fashioning the Securities Exchange Act 'of1934, Congress considered the question
whether to continue in effect the system of regulation by which the industry voluntarily
undertook to govern the conduct and professional standards of professional participants in
the securities markets or to rely instead on direct regulation by governmental authority.
Convinced that an attempt to regulate the industry directly through government on a wide
scale would be "ineffective," the Congress chose to develop a unique pattern of regulation
combining both industry and government responsibility. This pattern, which has remained
substantially unchanged for 40 years, calls upon industry organizations-the exchanges and
the NASD-to exercise delegated governmental power in order to enforce at their own
initiative compliance by members of the industry with both the legal requirements laid down
in the Securities Exchange Act and ethical standards which go beyond those requirements.

H.R.REP. No. 94-123, at 6 (1975). See also S.REP. NO. 94-75, at 22 (1975) (same).
67. Id.
68. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
69. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975) ("[L]itigation under Rule
lOb-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies
litigation in general."). One particularly graphic critic of securities lawyers was former Senator Alfonse
D'Amato of New York, who stated that plaintiffs' securities lawyers were "sharks, sharks for hire" and
"bandits." 141 CONG. REC. S 17,935-36 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
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emerge. For example, one consistent theme is that Congress valued
certain elements of self-regulation and did not want to regulate the
brokerage on a wide scale.70 Nor did Congress ever undertake to
displace state law claims generally or state fiduciary duty claims in
particular. 7 Nevertheless, Congress did intend to impose 'professional
standards" and "ethical standards" for "professional participants" in the
securities brokerage industry.7 2 In this initiative, Congress (and
President Roosevelt) certainly wanted to enhance investor remedies,
impose more demanding professional obligations, and thereby increase
investor confidence.7 3
B. The Text of the '34 Act
The text of the '34 Act, (as amended) embodies this intent of the
political branches. The foundation of federally mandated self-regulation
consists of 15 U.S.C. §§ 5,7 6, 15A 76 and 15(a)(8).77 Section 5 requires
the registration of all securities exchanges.78 Section 15(a)(8) requires
that all broker-dealers be members of either an exchange or a registered
securities association.79 Sections 6 and 15A specify the requirements of
registration for national securities exchanges and registered securities
associations, respectively." The only "securities association" registered
with the SEC is the NASD. 8 Both the NASD and the various stock
exchanges registered with the SEC (such as the NYSE) are defined in
the '34 Act as "self-regulatory organization [s]."82 All of this means that
every broker-dealer is a member of some self-regulatory organization.
The registration requirements mandate that SRO rules "are designed
to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices" and
"promotejust and equitable principles of trade."8 These mandates are

70.

Supra note 37.

71.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2000).

72. Supra notes 8, 9, 19, 27, 32, 33, 44, 52, 53, 60, 63 and 66.
73. Supra notes 9, 29, 52, 58 and 59.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2000) (prohibiting securities transactions except on registered exchanges).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(2000).

76.

15 U.S.C. § 78o.3 (2000).

77.

15 U.S.C. § 78o (2000).

78. Supra note 74.
79. Supra note 77.
80. Supra notes 75 and 76.
81. Supra note 46 & accompanying text.

82. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(26) (2000).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2000). More specifically, the SEC must deny registration to an exchange
unless its rules:
are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promotejust and
equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged
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specific requirements of a transcendent goal to "protect investors and
the public interest."84 The registration requirements for SROs further
mandate disciplinary procedures for violations of the '34 Act and SRO
rules and mandate sanctions for such violations including censures, fines,
suspensions, and expulsions.8" Moreover, an SRO may "summarily"
suspend anyone who has been expelled, barred, or suspended by any
other SRO.86 In other words, SROs have the power to impose the
professional death penalty upon the career of any securities professional.
Thus, each stock exchange and the NASD must require members to
treat customers not in accordance with the concept of caveat emptor but
rather in accordance with concepts of professionalism, and they must
enforce such standards of conduct. Certainly, the statutory language
requiring rules that "promote just and equitable principles of trade" is
consistent with professionalism and inconsistent with caveat emptor8 7
The '34 Act's reach extends beyond the broker-dealer itself to any
"person associated with a broker-dealer."88 Under the Act, these
individuals must take and pass entry examinations.89 In addition, such
persons may not enter or remain in the securities industry unless they
satisfy certain standards of character and fitness. °" Moreover, any
person who violates any SRO rule is also subject to an SEC enforcement action or administrative proceeding which may result in a bar
from the industry, fines, injunctive relief, or ancillary equitable relief
including disgorgement of any ill-gotten gains.9" The '34 Act also
provides criminal sanctions against any person who willfully violates the
Act, any person who knowingly makes a false statement on any form or
application filed pursuant to the Act, or any person who knowingly files
a false application with an SRO. 2 Thus, each person who has any

in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating
transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market and a national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the
public interest.
Id. Seealso
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6) (2000) (stating identical requirements for registration of national securities
association).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000) (stating that
one purpose of the '34 Act is to insure "fair and honest markets" fbr securities transactions).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(6) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(bX7) (2000).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d)(3) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h)(3) (2000).

87. 15 u.s.c. § 78R(b)(5) (2000).
88. Supra note 17.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (2000).
90. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2000).
91. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(I) (2000) (authorizing SEC to bring action "to enjoin" violation of
securities laws or SRO rules). Among the most significant provisions of the securities laws are the broad
antifraud provisions specifically applicable to broker-dealers. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (2000).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2000).
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degree of responsibility in the securities brokerage industry is subject to
detailed regulatory strictures and powerful civil and even criminal
sanctions.
Consistent with the '34 Act's theme of supervised self-regulation,
however, the SEC has power to supervise the SROs in virtually all
regulatory aspects.93 If an SRO fails in its enforcement duties, the SEC
may directly impose sanctions for violations of SRO rules.94 If an SRO
enacts a rule or regulation that the SEC deems inappropriate, the SEC
may "abrogate, add to, and delete from" the rule as it sees fit.95
C. SRO Rules ofProfessional Conduct
Because SRO rules are fundamentally focused upon customer
protection and investor rights, even the charters, constitutions, and
bylaws of such organizations recognize that they exist in part to assure
the protection of investors. The National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., Certificate of Incorporation states that the NASD was
formed to "adopt, administer, and enforce rules of fair practice and rules
to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts," "to promote . . . high
standards of commercial honor," and "to promote just and equitable
principles of trade for the protection of investors."96 The NYSE
constitution contains similar language articulating essentially the same
goals.97
The NASD, the NYSE, and all other SROs are governed by their
members. These members are broker-dealers, meaning that the
brokerage industry itself is responsible for imposing and enforcing SRO
standards.98 Still, the SEC has broad oversight power over the SROs,
93. The Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete from (hereinafter in this
subsection collectively referred to as "amend") the rules of a self-regulatory organization

(other than a registered clearing agency) as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate
to insure the fair administration of the self-regulatory organization, to conform its rules to
requirements of this [Act] and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to such

organization, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes ofthis [Act] ....

15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000).
94. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2000).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000).
96. NASD MANUAL, supra note 47, at 1011 (Paragraphs (i), (3) and (4)). The NASD is required by
law to impose rules designed to "promote just and equitable principles of trade," but appears to have gone
a step further in requiring "high standards of commercial honor." &e 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000). See also
NASD MANUAL, supra note 47, Rule 2110, at 4111.

97. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., CONSTITUTION AND RULEs 1021 (1996) (Paragraph
(2)) [hereinafter NYSE MANUAL].
98. NASD MANUAL, supra note 47, at 1012, 1014, 1301-03 (noting provisions of the Certificate of
Incorporation and By-Laws that limit membership to registered broker-dealers, endow members with the
right to elect Governors, and give Governors the right to manage the NASD).
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and federal law operates as the ultimate enforcement mechanism." The
SEC has plenary power over SRO rules.' 00 The SROs similarly are the
primary enforcers of their rules; still, the SEC has de novo appellate
review over all such sanctions.'
Federal law also provides that
discipline by one SRO is grounds for discipline by another SRO, such
that if a member is expelled by one SRO they are essentially barred
from participating as a member of any other SRO, and hence the entire
securities industry.1"2
The role of federal law and the SEC has not been prominent in the
promulgation of industry standards and SRO regulations. Rather, the
SEC and the prospect of further federal legislation have combined to
enforce a kind of self-discipline whereby the industry-dominated SROs
are able to successfully impose high standards of conduct upon an
industry wary of further government regulatory action.'0 3 This is
another purpose for the existence of SROs: "To promote self-discipline
among members . . . ."'" This combination of primary industry self-

regulation with close government supervision and government-backed
enforcement has proven to be a powerful recipe for high standards of
professional conduct.
The Commission in particular interpreted the scheme of selfregulation imposed by the '34 Act as sufficient to support broad
professional duties for registered broker-dealers under what has become
known as the "shingle-theory."10 5 In the seminal case of In re Duker &

99. The SEC has recently exercised this broad power over SROs against the NASD. In 1996, the
SEC published a detailed report of its investigation ofadministrative enforcement proceedings and settlement
of charges against the NASD for its operation of the NASDAQmarket and its oversight of the market. In
connection with the SEC actions, the NASD entered into lengthy settlement undertakings with the SEC to
remedy its shortcomings. See
geeralo SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-4.
l00. Supra note 93.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(l)(2000).
102. An expulsion, suspension, or bar from associating with a member of an SRO is defined as a
"statutory disqualification." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(39) (1994). A statutory disqualification isgrounds for being
barred from associating with a member of the NASD (15 U.S.C. § 780-3(g)(3)(A) (2000)) or any stock
exchange (15 U.S.C. § .78f(d)(3)(A) (2000)).
103. DOUGLAS, supra note 8, at 82.

104. NASD MANUAL, supra note 47, at 1011 (Paragraph (4)).
105. Professor Louis .,oss iscredited with coining the term "the Shingle Theory" to encapsulate the
basis for inherent professional obligations:
[l]n 1939 . . . the Commission for the first time held in the course of a broker-dealer
revocation proceeding that it was a fraud under the securities laws for a dealer to sell
securities to a customer at a price not reasonably related to the current market. This has
nothing to do with any agency obligation. The theory isthat even a dealer at arm's length
impliedly represents when he hangs out his shingle that he will deal fairly with the public.
It isan element of that implied representation, the theory goes, that his prices will bear some
reasonable relation to the current market unless he discloses to the contrary. Therefore,
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Duker, ' 6 the Commission stated: "Inherent in the relationship between
a dealer and [its] customer is the vital representation that the customer
will be dealt with fairly and in accordance with the standards of the
profession."'° 7 By 1943, the SEC's "shingle theory" had the benefit of
court imprimatur, evidencing a broad consensus among authorities that
the '34 Act had imposed inherent professional obligations upon brokerdealers, indeed even upon dealers acting in a principal capacity.'
The SRO rules governing broker-dealer conduct attest to the success
of this regime in giving rise to a scheme of self-regulation that imposes
a code of conduct that both protects customers and allows the industry
to impose efficient business practices. These standards of professional
conduct generally fall into four categories of professional duties in favor
of customers of registered broker-dealers: first, brokers must only make
recommendations of securities to customers that are suitable in light of
the customer's investment objectives and capabilities; second, brokerdealers may not engage in "churning," the exercise of control over an
account to generate excessive transactions (and commissions) in light of
a customer's investment objectives; third, the SRO rules impose broad
supervisory duties upon broker-dealers; and fourth, a broker must
observe general "high standards of commercial honor" and "just and
equitable principles of trade."
1. Suitability
The suitability requirement means that a broker has an affirmative
duty to take "reasonable efforts" to assure that a recommendation is in
accordance with a customer's objectives and financial status.10 9 The
NYSE has its own version of the suitability requirement, and in some
respects the NYSE has interpreted its rule in a more demanding manner

charging a price that does not bear such a relation is a breach of the dealer's implied
representation and works a fraud on the customer.
Louis Loss, The SEC and the Broker-Dealer, I VAND. L. REV. 516, 518 (1948).
106. 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939).
107. Id. at 388.
108. See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943).
109. Business Conduct Rule 2310(a), for example, requires that any recommendation a broker makes
to a customer be supported by a reasonable belief that the recommendation is "suitable." Business Conduct
Rule 2310(b) requires that before executing transactions recommended to non-institutional customers, other
than transactions limited to money market mutual funds, "a member shall make reasonable efforts to obtain
information concerning: (1)the customer's financial status; (2) the customer's tax status; (3) the customer's
investment objectives; and (4) such other information used or considered to be reasonable... in making
recommendations to the customer." NASD MANUAL, supra note 47, at 4261.
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than the NASD obligation."' Additionally, industry-sponsored arbitration fora have spawned numerous cases where brokers have been held
liable under the suitability doctrine for allowing customers to undertake
excessively risky trading."' Ultimately, these industry authorities insist
that suitability requirements demand an "ongoing supervision" of a
customer's trading to avoid allowing the securities markets to devolve
into casinos.112
2. Churning
The prohibition against "churning" precludes a broker from using
control over a customer's account to generate excessive trading activity,
in view of the customer's financial resources, objectives, and needs, in
order to maximize commissions. 1"' The NASD has prohibited such
excessive trading through interpretive memoranda." 4 In determining
whether activity is excessive, the SEC has used its administrative powers

110. See NYSE MANUAL, supranote 97, Rule 405, at 3696 (requiring every member of the Exchange
to use "due diligence" to obtain "essential" facts relative to every customer and every order). For example,
the NYSE has indicated that its rule even applies to discount brokers, who typically offer mere transaction
facilities. SeeMichael Siconolfi, Discounters Must Watch Outfor Customers, B Board Says, WALL ST.J., July 19,
1991, at CI.
Ill. See
Rebecca Buckman, Discount and Online Brokers Wony About Investor Cases, WALL ST.J., Nov. 25,
1998, at C i; Michael Siconolfi, "Drainshop"AwardsIncreasingy Slapped on Brokerage Finns, WALL ST.J., Sept.
4, 1992, at A4. The Supreme Court has ruled that brokerage firms may require their customers to submit
disputes to industry-sponsored arbitration fora, such as the arbitration procedure administered by the NASD.
E.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,486 (1989) (holding that because
"resort to the arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the substantive rights afforded...
under the Securities Act[s]," such claims are arbitrable). A ruling in such an arbitration proceeding will not
be disturbed by the courts absent a showing that the arbitrators acted in manifest disregard of the law.
Sanders v. Gardner, 7 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938, 941 (1995)). Indeed, the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure does not even require that
the arbitrators be lawyers. See NASD MANUAL, supra note 47, at 7501-7633. Thus, these arbitration
proceedings provide excellent examples of industry standards applied to customer-broker disputes.
112. Peterzell v. Charles Schwab & Co., NASD Arb. No. 88-0268, 1991 WL 202358, at *2 (June 17,
1991). See also Cass v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, NASD Arb. No. 91-01484, 1994 WL 1248585, at *5 (Jan.
31, 1994) ("it was especially improper to allow [the customer] to continue his disastrous trading" at a point
when the broker knew he had insufficient resources for high risk trading, because "Shearson holds out its
registered representatives to be not merely brokers but 'financial consultants' and "[a] competent financial
consultant never would have permitted" such a trading strategy). The NASD Department of Enforcement
echos this view of the professional obligations of brokers in the context of the suitability requirement. See In
re Robert J. Kemweis, NASD Disciplinary Proceeding No. C02980024 (2000), available at
http://wwvw.nasdr.com/2657c.asp (stating that there is a difference between aggressive investing and
excessive trading and that an investment objective of speculation does not excuse excessive trading) (citing
In re Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-26766, 49 S.E.C. 1119 (1989), available
at 1989 WL 257097 (Apr. 28, 1989)).
113. See general0yJAFFE,supra note 28, §§ 15.0 1-15.04.
114. NASD MANUAL, supra note 47, IM-23 10, at 4262. See also NYSE MANUAL, supra note 97, Rule
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to define and prohibit "churning."' 115 The courts have also played a
significant role in defining when a broker controls an account as well as
when trading is "excessive." ' 16 In fact, the SEC long ago recognized
that a broker may inappropriately control an account even in the
absence of a formal grant of discretionary trading authority." 7
Together, the suitability requirement and the churning prohibition
mean that brokers may not put their interests before the customer, and
they must exercise care in recommending transactions.
3. Supervisory Duties
An additional source of mandated industry standards arises from the
SRO requirement that all firms maintain compliance manuals designed
to assure that firms and their agents comply with the securities laws and
SRO rules and regulations. "' Every broker-dealer also may use
compliance manuals as a means of transmitting its own higher standards
of professional conduct to its agents. Courts typically hold firms to their
own articulated standards of professionalism." 9 Examples of firms
imposing higher standards include such undertakings as terminating
accounts to protect customers from their own excessively risky trading
when circumstances so demand.'20

115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 5c 1-7 (2001). Indeed, the SEC essentially created the churning prohibition in
1937 through the promulgation of Rule 15c1-7. JAFFE, supra note 28, at 307. See also In re Inserra, [19881989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,334 (Sept. 30, 1988) (assessing extent of margin
indebtedness, commissions as a percentage of account equity, and turnover ratio to determine if trading was
excessive); In re E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 380 (1945) (stating that churning requires a
showing that the broker induced activity in the customer's account which, in view of the character and
financial resources of the account, was excessive).
116. E.g., Shamsi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,356, at 95,356 (D. Mass.July 16, 1990) (holding that churning may occur even though the broker did not
have formal discretionary authority); Altschul v. Paine, Webber,Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 591
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that control over the customer may be shown if the customer "routinely" follows
the broker's recommendations).
117. "[VMiolation of the excessive trading principle may be found to exist wherever the broker or
dealer enjoys practical discretionary power in that, by reason of the trust and reliance of the customer, he
is able to dictate or influence the timing and frequency of the transactions." In re Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323,
328 n. 10 (1948).
118. "Each member shall establish... a system ... that is reasonably designed to achieve compliance
with applicable securities laws... and with the Rules of this Association." NASD MANUAL, supra note 47,
Rule 3010, at 483 1. At a minimum, this requires the establishment of written procedures. Id.
119. See, e.g., Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 1980) (utilizing internal
manual to support finding of fiduciary duty).
120. See, e.g., Fahnestock Compliance Manual (on file with author). Most courts have not imposed a
duty to terminate excessive trading, although SROs have imposed such a duty. E.g., Powers v. Francis I.
DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also supra notes 11 1-113.
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4. High Standards of Conduct

General requirements of "high standards of commercial honor" and
"just and equitable principles of trade" have given rise to numerous
other interesting applications.12' For example, a broker acting in a
principal capacity (selling securities out of the broker's inventory) may
not charge acustomer an "excessive" markup in price.122 Similarly, a
broker may not use knowledge of a customer's order to generate
personal profits by "interpositioning" a trade of a broker or by "frontrunning" ahead of the order.123 This transcendent obligation of fairness
has been extended to require brokers to obtain the best transaction
executions available for customers, 124 to refrain from taking improper
steps to evade liability, 25 and to assure that the public has a bona fide
opportunity to participate in initial public offerings of securities that
standard imposes broad
become "hot issues.""' In sum, this industry
27
obligations of fairness and disclosure. 1
In general, and with certain important exceptions, these industry
standards correlate to fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and disclosure.
The obligations imposed under these industry standards, however, are
particularized to the broker-dealer context and do not have the same
kind of general breadth associated with broad fiduciary duties.
Moreover, nowhere in the statutory scheme is the term "fiduciary" used
in connection with the mandatory general industry standards imposed
under the '34 Act. The legislative history of the Act does include one
reference to the term "fiduciary." However, the great weight of the
legislative history and the language used by President Roosevelt in
support of the '34 Act evinces an intent to avoid invoking the term.
Thus, interpreting the plain meaning of the statute and its legislative
history leads to a clear conclusion: the '34 Act did not intend to impose
a federal fiduciary obligation upon broker-dealers, provide any federal
fiduciary duty remedies, or in any way disturb or interfere with the
121. NASD MANUAL, supra note 47, Rule 2110, at 4111 ("A member, in the conduct of his business,
shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.").
122. Id., IM-2440, at 4351 (establishing a guideline of five percent markups).
123. Id., IM-2110-3, at4123.
124. Id., Rule 2320, at 4265.
125. E.g., Cosse Int'l Sec., Inc., SEC Release No. 34-26424 (1989) (affirming SRO findings that
belatedly delivering documents and seeking execution of certain assignment forms was a violation ofjust and
equitable principles of trade).
126. NASD MANUAL, supra note 47, IM 2110-1, at4112.
127. The NASD has also stated that any violation of the SEC's shingle theory is "usually" a violation
of fair and equitable principles of trade. See NASD MANUAL, supra note 47, IM-2310-2, at 4262-63. The
Commission has recognized that "when a securities dealer opens his business he is, in effect, representing
that he will deal fairly with the public." Id. Thus, the NASD has essentially adopted the "shingle theory"
as part of its articulation of "just and equitable principles of trade."
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development of fiduciary principles. under state law. The next Part of
this Article addresses the intent of the drafters of the federal securities
laws with respect to the effect of SRO rules upon the civil liability of
brokers to customers.
III. SRO RULES AND PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY

The conclusion that Congress did not intend to impose federal
fiduciary principles is central to the broker-dealer regulation provisions
of the '34 Act. The Act reflects a determination to raise industry
standards within the context of the traditional self-regulation of the
securities brokerage industry. Self-regulation, in its most modem form,
has three primary advantages: first, "industry participants bring to bear
expertise and intimate knowledge of the securities industry and thereby
should be able to respond quickly to regulatory problems;" second,
"self-regulation supplements the resources of the government and
reduces the need for large government bureaucracies;" and third, SROs
can adopt and enforce compliance with "ethical standards beyond those
required by law."' 128 Imposing broad fiduciary obligations or detailed
statutory mandates would frustrate the foundations of self-regulation.
This Article posits that Congress rejected traditional notions of caveat
emptor as well as any broad federal fiduciary obligation and instead chose
a third means of raising industry norms: professionalization
and
29
accompanying liability for malpractice under state law.1
A. SRO Rules and Implied PrivateActions
Noticeably absent from the entire scheme of mandatory self-regulation is any authorization of a private right of action for a violation of an
SRO rule or regulation. Instead, in terms of broker misconduct short
of fraud, Congress
seems to have intended state law claims to play the
130
role.
dominant

128. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
129. Supra note50.
130. The rights and remedies provided by this [Act] shall be in addition to any and all other
rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person permitted to maintain
a suit for damages under the provisions of this [Act] shall recover, through satisfaction of
judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account
of the act complained of. Nothing in this [Act] shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security
or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this [Act] or the rules and
regulations thereunder.

15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000).
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Shortly after the promulgation of the '34 Act, both the courts as well
as the SEC broadly interpreted the Act's provisions to support private
rights of action.' 3 ' More recently, however, federal courts have
restricted private rights of action. 32 Under the more modem approach
to implying private rights of action under a federal statute, courts
presume a lack of congressional intent to authorize such suits in the
absence of some statutory provision supporting such a private right of
action. 133 Courts have thus ruled that violations of SRO rules do not
support implied rights of action. 3 4 In the case of professional obliga-

tions in the securities industry, it is therefore difficult to show that
Congress intended to provide investors with federal private rights of
action.
On the other hand, the breach of an SRO rule may play a role in
private actions under Rule lOb-5. Here, courts use SRO rules as
evidence of fraud or standards by which to judge whether conduct is
consistent with scienter.3 5 Scienter requires, at least a showing of
recklessness, and SRO rules have been used to support a finding that a
broker recklessly omitted to disclose a material fact.3 6 This approach
seems consistent with Congressional intent, as breach of industry
standards is not tantamount to showing an intent to defraud, but such
a breach does reveal much about a securities professional's state of
mind, especially
since a professional can be presumed to know industry
37
standards.
Aside from the lack of congressional intent, implied rights of action
from breach of SRO rules suffer from other infirmities. They would, for
example, involve the federal judiciary in a meddlesome and activist role
in the securities brokerage industry that runs contrary to the premise of

131. See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (allowing private
right of action under Rule 1Ob-5).
132. See generally Donald H. Ziegler, Rghts, Rfghts ofAction. andRenmedies: An IntegratedApproach,76 WASH.
L. RE'. 67, 68 (2001).
133. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78-85 (1975).
134. See Colman v. D. H. Blair & Co., 434 F. Supp. 37 (D.D.C. 1977) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.

66 (1975)); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that section 6 of the '34 Act
neither confers rights on private parties nor prescribes any conduct as unlawful and thus evinces lack of
intent to create a private cause of action); Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d
1413, 1419 (11 th Cir. 1983) (deciding there is no implied private cause of action for a violation of SRO
suitability rules); Zemaitis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1552, 1553
(W.D.N.Y. 1984) (explaining that a violation of SRO suitability rules does not create an implied cause of

action under federal securities laws). See also Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,470.
135. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co.,
619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980).
136. E.g., O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1992).
137. E.g., Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885, 888.n.6 (5th Cir. 1987).
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self-regulation.' 38 Additionally, transforming industry standards into
"legal" claims necessarily substitutes judges for industry experts in the
process of applying the standards.' 39 Thus, the securities industry seems
particularly ill-suited for recognition of private claims against violators
of SRO rules.
B. Fiduciay Obligationsof Securities Brokers Under State Law
Whether described as "considerable confusion" or as "judicial
smoke," it is clear that courts have not always consistently articulated
the fiduciary obligations of broker-dealers under state law."4 Even a
cursory review of authorities shows deep division within the courts
regarding the fiduciary duties ofbroker-dealers.'l Some courts seem to
follow the traditional rule that a broker always owes a customer a
fiduciary duty.'4 2 Other courts seem to impose fiduciary duties only
upon a showing that a customer has authorized a broker to trade on the
customer's behalf in a discretionary account.'43 Sometimes, courts
within the same jurisdiction seem to take drastically different approaches
to the issue of fiduciary duties owed by a stockbroker. 44 But by any

notes 32 and 40.
138. See supra
139. In professional malpractice cases, an expert typically applies the industry standard, not the court.
See infia note 200.
140. See Hicks, supra note 11,at 709; Goforth, supra note'1 I, at 442. See also Weiss, supra note 11,at
68 ("Fiduciary duty as applied to broker-dealers is difficult to understand without some explanation of its
many disparate strands. Courts have often failed to do a careful analysis of the duty, resulting in erroneous,
confusing or poorly explained opinions.").
141. See Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d 523, 530 (5th Cir. 1986); Leib
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951,953 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Congregation of
the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 800 F.2d 177, 182 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting the
fiduciary relation arises where dealings between customer and broker have caused customer to repose special
trust or confidence); Caravan Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769 F.2d 561,
567 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining that broker must control customer's account before fiduciary duty arises).
See also Roberson v. PaineWebber, Inc., 998 P.2d 193, 198 (Okla. 2000) (holding that existence of fiduciary
duty owed by broker is an issue for the trier of fact to decide).
142. See Roth v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659, 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Twomey v. MitchumJones &
Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 236 (Ct. App. 1968) (quoting CHARLES H. MEYER, THE LAW OF
STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES AND OFCOMMODITY BROKERS ANDCOMMODITY EXCHANGES

253 (1931)).
143. See Independent Order ofForesters v.Donald, Lufkin &Jenrette, Inc. 157 F.3d 933,940 (2d Cir.
1998) (" T]here is no general fiduciary duty inherent in an ordinary broker/customer relationship."); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Boeck, 377 N.W.2d 605,608 (Wis. 1985); Shearson Hayden Stone,
Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1978); Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 337
453 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1972).
F. Supp. 107, IlI(N.D. Ala. 1971), aft'4
144. Compare Shaw v. Dreyfus & Co., 314 N.Y.S.2d 372, 379 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) (noting that
broker/customer relationship is a "sensitive fiduciary relationship"), with Sherman v. Sokoloff, 570 F. Supp.
1266, 1269-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (maintaining that broker owes a duty only when broker controls the
customer's account).
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measure, it is clear that courts are approaching the issue of fiduciary
duties in a more restrictive fashion than in the past. 115
In 1934, Congress assumed that an ordinary stockbroker owed
fiduciary duties to clients with respect to the giving of investment
advice."'4 This concept of fiduciary duty was general and wideranging." The courts in pre-1934 days applied the fiduciary concept
to brokers in a variety of circumstances, but with a less professionalized
industry in mind.'48 Thus, there was no corollary to the churning
prohibition or the suitability doctrine. 49 A dealer on the other hand,
called a "jobber" in many sources, was held to deal with customers on
a principal-to-principal basis rather than as agent-to-principal.15 The
logical upshot of this distinction is that dealers generally did not owe
fiduciary duties.' 5' The '34 Act gives short shrift to this distinction, and

145. Compare Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("[T]he duties of
a securities broker are, if anything, more stringent than those imposed by general agency law."), afft'367
F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966), with Press v.Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 52d, 537 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that
a broker-customer relationship is not ordinarily a fiduciary relationship and that a broker's fiduciary
obligation, if any, is generally limited to completion of the transaction).
146. H.R. REP.'No. 73-1383, at 15 (1934) ("There is an inherent inconsistency in ...acting both as
a broker and a dealer. It is difficult to serve two masters. And it is particularly difficult to give impartial
advice to a client if the dealer-broker has his own securities to sell ....").See also generally CHARLES H.
MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES AND OF CONIMODrry BROKERS AND
COMMODITY EXCHANGES §§ 40-46 (193 1). By 1933, there were numerous reported decisions holding that
brokers must observe fiduciary standards in giving investment advice. Id. § 46 (1933 Supp.) ("The broker
...is held to a high degree of skill and integrity.").
147. As one commentator stated:
By the early twentieth century, the body of common law governing brokers as agents was well
developed. The broker, acting as an agent, was held to a fiduciary standard and was
prohibited from self-dealing, acting for conflicting interests, bucketing orders, trading against
customer orders, obtaining secret profits, and hypothecating customers' securities in excessive
amounts-all familiar concepts under modem securities law. Under common law, however,
a broker acting as principal for his own account, such as a dealer or other vendor, was by
definition not an agent and owed no fiduciary duty to the customer. The parties, acting
principal to principal as buyer and seller, were regarded as being in an adverse contractual
relationship in which agency principles did not apply.
note II, at 67 (emphasis omitted).
Weiss, supra
148. See generally Galigher v. Jones, 129 U.S. 193, 201 (1889) (stating that stockbroker-client
relationship should be viewed as a "trust relation"); Warwick v. Addicks, 157 A. 205,206 (Del. 1931) (stating
that broker owes customer fiduciary duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty" regarding "all dealings
conceming or affecting the subject matter of his agent"); Haight v. Haight & Freese Co., 98 N.Y.S.471,473
(N.Y. App. Div. 1906) (stating that broker owes a fiduciary duty); Poor & Co. v. Mathis, 14 Ohio Law Abs.
453 (Ohio 1933) (holding that the relation of broker-customer was fiduciary).
149. The churning prohibition and suitability doctrine date to a 1937 SEC decision. JAFFE, supra note
28, at 307.
150. See generally William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, Stock "Brokers" as Agents andDealers, 43 YALE
LJ. 46, 53, 56 (1933) (stating that a broker is a "fiduciary-agent" liable for negligence and that a dealer acts
adversely to a customer).
151. Id.
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52
the SEC has in many ways obliterated it in its "shingle theory" cases.1
Thus, in terms of both fiduciary duties' 53 and minimum professional
standards of conduct, 154 modem law makes no distinction between the
obligations that brokers and dealers have to their customers.' 5
Congress nowhere contemplated the concept of limited fiduciary duty
that has recently emerged in the securities brokerage industry. 56
' Some
courts have sharply circumscribed the limits of a general fiduciary duty
in a typical broker-client relationship.' 57 Under this approach, a broker
may dispense with most traditional fiduciary obligations simply by

refraining from exercising discretion 158 over an account.' 59 In these

circumstances, a broker's fiduciary duty is limited to proper execution
of trades-which is roughly akin to requiring a car salesman to
discharge a fiduciary obligation through proper execution of a bill of
sale. 6 ° Indeed, after twenty-five years, this narrow conception of
fiduciary duty has nevergiven rise to liability for improper execution of
trades in a reported decision.' 6 '
Although Congress may not have predicted that over time states
would greatly relax the fiduciary obligation of securities brokers, the
result is fully consonant with the intent of the '34 Act.162 Section 28 has
always operated to leave state claims to state law, and state courts have

152. &e supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
153. See generally Weiss, supra note 1 ,at 75.
154. For example, the NASD Rules of Conduct include no distinction between dealers and brokers.
See generally NASD MANUAL, supra note 47, at 4101-4985.
155. Specifically, the key customer protection elements of broker-dealer regulation turn upon
considerations other than whether the given defendant is a broker or a dealer. Suitability turns upon
whether a recommendation was made.
Supra notes 109-112.
Churning turns on control or
recommendations. Supra notes 113-117.
156. See, e.g., Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953, 955 (E.D.
Mich. 1978) (explaining that in the context of a non-discretionary account, a broker owes a fiduciary duty
only on a transaction-by-transaction basis, and these "limited" transactional duties "cease" after the
"transaction is completed"). Commentators have recognized that Leib was a "seminal" case in terms of
articulating a restrictive approach to a broker's fiduciary duty. Kg., Weiss, supra note 1I,at 114.
157. See, e.g., Gouger'v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 823 F. Supp. 282, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that
fiduciary duties flowing from securities broker to customer are "circumscribed") (citing Schenck v. Bear,
Stems & Co., 484 F. Supp. 937, 947 (S.D.N.Y., 1979) (noting that the fiduciary duty of a broker is generally
"limited to the completion of the transaction").
158. Discretion has been defined to tur upon issues of broker control instead of formalistic authority
to trade without prior approval of the customer. E.g.,
Leib, 461 F. Supp. at 954.
159. See Hotmar v. Lowell H. Listrom Co., 808 F.2d 1384 (1Oth Cir. 1987) (finding that lack of control
precluded a finding of fiduciary duty); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding no fiduciary duty owed to a speculative investor in non-discretionary account).
160. "Since Stotler operated a nondiscretionary account for Dierschke, it did not owe him a fiduciary
duty." Stotler & Co. v. Dierschke, No. 88-C-7135, 1993 WL 128141, at *2 (N.D. III. Apr. 21, 1993). See
also
supra note 156.
161. Seegeneral1 Weiss, supra note 11.
162. See supra note 132.
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consequently been the final arbitrators of the fiduciary obligations owed
by securities brokers. 16 ' Implicit in this regime is the fact that state
regulation (through claims of breach of fiduciary duty) may be an
inadequate means of imposing high standards of commercial conduct
in the securities industry.'64
In the final analysis, concepts of fiduciary duty fall short of the goal of
conservative investor protection in the securities brokerage industry.
Fiduciary duty may serve well as a state-by-state ceiling upon broker
obligations, where states may need to balance investor protection
against the possibility of raising business costs to prohibitive levels.
However, a federal minimum standard of professional conduct,
embodied in SRO rules, has the immeasurable benefit of being
promulgated and supported by industry expertise and experience.' 65 A
judge sitting in equity jurisdiction, or a jury sitting to determine
damages, is a poor substitute for industry leaders and experts in
determining appropriate conduct. 66
' Thus, fiduciary duty has operated,
and probably should continue to operate, restrictively as a basis for
imposing nationalized standards ofprofessional conduct in the securities
industry. 167

163. SeeGreenwood v. Dittmer, 776 F.2d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting the existence of a fiduciary
duty must be determined by reference to state law); McGinn v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
736 F.2d 1254, 1258 (8th Cir. 1984) (explaining that whether a fiduciary duty exists between a broker and
a customer is a question of state law).
164. Indeed, Congress enacted the securities laws in full view of the shortcomings of state legislation
in the securities industry. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1(1933) ("In spite of many State statutes the public in
the past has sustained severe losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons
and corporations selling securities.") (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress, Mar. 29,
1933).
165. Supra notes 35, 36, 65, and 130.
166. As Professor Hicks has observed:
There are two main risks which result from relying on a tool as powerful and amenable as
the fiduciary principle to establish a foundation for broker and dealer duties. First, it invites
the creation of extravagant duties. Second, the choice ofan exacting model of accountability
can, by itself, invite carelessness by courts and regulators in thinking through the soundness
of specific proposed duties. The purpose of this Article is to stress the need for grounding
broker-dealer duties in sound, articulated understandings of the investment markets, as well
as defensible statements of the responsibilities and expectations of both customers and market
professionals. This important need will be demonstrated through the use of several cases
illustrating problematical or failed processes by which broker-dealer duties have been
established.
Hicks, supra note 11, at 711-12.
167. This is not to say that those courts that have adhered to a restrictive approach to fiduciary duties
are not resting upon a weak policy basis. Seeinfra Part IV. Nor is this to say that these courts are resting
upon a sound doctrinal analysis. Commentators have appropriately recognized that:
The key issue in determining the broker's duty is control. At a minimum, broker-dealers are
charged with a duty ofloyalty when acting as agents. That is, when transacting business on
behalf of customers. As the broker's control of the account increases, so does the broker's
fiduciary duty. Acting solely as an agent in executing orders, the broker is charged only with
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C. SRO Rules and State Law ProfessionalLiability Claims
The language and legislative history of the '34 Act certainly addressed
broker duties even if they failed to impose either a broad new federal
68
fiduciary duty or private rights of action against errant brokers.'
Additionally, the specific intent of the '34 Act was to elevate commercial
standards of conduct within the brokerage industry to higher and more
uniform standards and to create a durable scheme of regulation to
protect investors and restore investor confidence. 169 The '34 Act uses
terminology consistent with fiduciary obligations, but in the end it opts
for terms more akin to professional obligations and high commercial
standards rather than broad fiduciary obligations. 7 ' This, in turn, is
fully consistent with the Act's aim to preserve industry self-regulation
while placing such regulation on a firmer foundation. 7 ' Because the
similarity between the concepts underlying fiduciary principles and the
mandatory federal standards is so apparent (and at least at one point in
the legislative record downright invisible),' and because in the context
of the securities field they bear similar functions, it is somewhat
understandable that the legal analysis of brokers' professional obligations has essentially been subsumed into the analysis of fiduciary
duties.'
Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the mandatory federal
standards are best viewed as professional standards.' 74 The remainder
of this Article will therefore use this terminology when referring to the
structure of industry standards built upon the foundation of the '34 Act.

a duty of timely execution according to the customer's instructions. When the broker takes
it upon himself to make a recommendation to the customer, the duty increases; a reasonable
basis for the recommendation is required. In the case of a discretionary account, or an

account controlled in fact by the broker, the broker's duty approaches that of a trustee.
Accordingly, a limitation of duty, and liability therefore, is contingent to diminishing the

broker's control over the customer's account and refraining from making recommendations.
Weiss, supra note 11, at 119.
168. Supra note 66.
169. Supra notes 9 and 10.
170. See supra Part 1I.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 36 and 38.
172. Supra note 132.
173. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1290 (S.D. Ohio 1996)
(holding that a broker malpractice claim is "redundant" to contract and fiduciary duty claims). The use of
the term "redundant" seems odd in this context since professional negligence could well extend a remedy
in a situation where a plaintiff could prove neither fraud nor a fiduciary duty.

174. This appears to be the most frequently used terminology in Congress. Supra notes 44, 52, 53, 60,
and 66.
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Congress intended to elevate industry standards and to enhance
enforcement mechanisms, all in the name of investor protection. 15 In
light of this, it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended
to leave standards of conduct unchanged or to leave investors with no
remedies at all for the newly mandated industry standards.'76 This is
especially so given the "broad remedial purposes" of the federal
securities laws. 77
' Accordingly, there must be a strong presumption that
Congress intended to enhance the hand of investors against brokerdealers who violated Congress's new uniform standards of professional
conduct. 7 The strong sanction provisions of the '34 Act further suggest
that Congress did not wish to skimp upon enforcement methods for
industry standards.'79 Private enforcement has always been deemed
integral to the overall regulatory scheme of the federal securities laws.' 80
Government agencies do not enjoy sufficient funding stability to
shoulder the sole burden of enforcement.' 8 ' Prominent government
regulators themselves have emphasized the importance of private
enforcement to the efficacy of the securities laws.8 2

175. Supra note 7.
176. Supra notes 7 and 10.
177. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983)). See also supra note 7.
178. See S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 12 (1934).
Experience ... has demonstrated the inadequacy of criminal penalties as the sole sanction.
Customers are ordinarily reluctant to resort to criminal proceedings, and in the absence of
complaints..., the discovery of violations is often impossible. Furthermore, if an investor
has suffered a loss by reason of illicit practices, it is equitable that he should be allowed to
recover ....
Id.
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2000) (granting enforcement authority to the SEC for SRO rule violations);
15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (2000) (granting authority to the SEC to impose administrative sanctions for SRO rule
violations); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(39) (2000) (defining SRO sanctions as a "statutory disqualification" which can
lead to being barred from the industry).
180. E.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299,310 (1985) (stating that private
actions are indispensable for the enforcement of securities laws).
181. See, e.g., Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The resources of the [SEC]
are adequate to prosecute only the most flagrant abuses."). Experience has taught that the funding of the
SEC is, unfortunately, subject to political caprice. For example, during the 1980s, when regulation of all
sorts was out of vogue, the SEC was chronically underfunded. It was not until the end of the decade, when
the pervasive crime in our financial markets began to manifest itself, that Congress authorized appropriate
funding. See The Market Reform Act of1989: Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. n Sec. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking
Hous., and UrbanAffairs, 101 st Cong. 11 (1989) (statement of Sen. Sasser) (noting approval of eighteen percent
increase in SEC funding after it was "underfunded throughout the 198 0's at a time when volume and
complexity in the markets has increased enormously").
182. The former SEC Chief of Enforcement has stated: "Given the continued growth in the size and
complexity of our securities markets, and the absolute certainty that persons seeking to perpetrate financial
fraud will always be among us, private actions will continue to be essential to the maintenance of investor
protection." PrivateLitgation Under the FederalSecurities Laws: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Secs. of the Sen. Comm.
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 113 (1993) (statement of William R. McLucas, Director,
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Under legal principles extant in 1934, this congressional imposition
of a mandatory self-regulatory regime that articulated high standards of
professional conduct had great significance."8 3 Then, as now, professionals owed duties of due care to observe professional standards of
conduct. 8 4 Holding securities professionals to these uniform, expertly
promulgated standards is fully in accordance" 5 with the intent of the '34
Act and each significant Congressional effort to amend the Act with
respect to broker-dealer regulation since 1934.186

Setting industry standards had enormous legal implications under
state law principles in 1934, and it has enormous implications under
state law principles today.8 7 Courts have imposed higher standards

Division of Enforcement, SEC) [hereinafterPriatelitigationHearings]; see also David S. Ruder, The Development
of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation 77te SEC tE2rperience, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (pointing out,
as former Chairman of the SEC, that "private securities litigation plays an essential role in federal securities

regulation" and that approximately ninety percent of securities cases were privately pursued in 1988).
Indeed, a representative of the North American Securities Administrators Association, an organization
representing all fifty state securities regulators, stated: "[PIrivate actions... are essential to deter prospective
criminals, compensate the victims of fraud, and maintain public confidence in the marketplace." Private
Litigation Hearings, supra, at 124 (statement of Mark J. Griffin, Director, Division of Securities, Utah
Department of Commerce).

183. See Smith v. Marks Isaacs Co., 147 So. 118 (La. Ct. App. 1933) (holding that a beauty shop
operator was not liable where the operator adhered to standards in industry); Pratt v. E.W. Edwards & Son,
237 N.Y.S. 372 (N.Y. App. Div. 1929) (noting that by soliciting patronage, a beauty shop operator assures
the public it has requisite skill and knowledge to discharge the occupation); Shatz Realty Co. v. King, 10
S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1928) (holding a real estate broker to the professional standard of care); Milliken v.
Woodward, 45 A. 796 (NJ. 1900) (holding an insurance broker to the professional standard of care). See also
O'Connor v. Burns, Potter & Co., 36 N.W.2d 507, 519 (Neb. 1949) (holding an investment firm that held
itself out as specially skilled to that degree of care and skill as would be exercised by other investment firms);
Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Wash. 1961) (noting that where an insurance agent holds
himself out to be an expert, he will be held to a commensurate standard of care).
184. Experienced milk haulers, hockey coaches, expert skiers, construction inspectors, and
doctors must all use care which is reasonable in light of their superior learning and
experience, and any special skills, knowledge or training they may personally have over and
above what is normally possessed by persons in the field.
Professional persons in general, and those who undertake any work calling for special
skill, are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do, but also to possess a
standard minimum of special knowledge and ability.
W. PAGE KEETON Fr AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 185 (5th ed. 1984). This more demanding
professional standard of care has also been held applicable to pharmacists, pilots, nurses, karate teachers,

veterinarians, and travel agents. Id. at 185-86 and n.31. More recently, it has been applied to social workers,
bankers, and health care payors. Id. § 32, at n.31 (Supp. 1987).
185. E.g.,Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756, 763 (Md. 1986) (finding that holding bank to
negligence standard was consistent with legislative regulation of banks and public policy of the state).
186. Supra notes 17-96.
187. "[C]ourts have turned to published ethical standards and practices of real estate brokers to
determine the requisite skill and knowledge, and acceptable practices, of members in good standing in that
occupation." Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465, 471 (Iowa 1985) ("Application of [Restatement § 299A]
requires a plaintiff... to produce evidence to show the standards of conduct and practices, or bench marks,
that establish the requisite skill and knowledge of members in good standing in the defendant's trade or
profession."). Menzel involved a claim of real estate broker malpractice, but courts have relied upon
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upon professionals specifically "because the higher standards of care
imposed on them by their profession and by... licensing requirements
engenders trust in them by clients that is not the norm of the marketplace."' 8 8 The law usually imposes a duty of care upon persons holding
themselves out to the public as having specialized skill. Under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,'8 9 professionals (or those engaged in a
skilled trade) are duty-bound to exercise a professional standard of
care-meaning they must observe industry standards. 9 ° This professional obligation inheres in the professional relationship and may be
enforced either in an action sounding in tort or contract.' 9 ' In other
words, professionals implicitly warrant that they will exercise the degree
of skill and judgment that can reasonably be expected from similarly
situated professionals.' 9 2 Generally, breach of professional standards
gives rise to favorable construction of statutes of limitations,' 93 restricted
defenses such as comparative negligence, 194 and freedom from the
restrictions of the "economic loss doctrine," which is recognized in
professional or trade standards to evidence the standard of liability in a myriad of trades or professions. See,
e.g.,Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P.2d 1238, 1250 (Wash. App. 1975) (lawyers); Avey v. St. Francis Hosp. &
Sch.ofNursing, Inc., 442 P.2d 1013, 1020-22 (Kan. 1968) (nursing); Darlingv. Charleston Cmty. Memorial
Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 256 (Ill.
1965) (hospitals).
188. SeeHosp. Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351, 1361 (D. NJ. 1992).
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 299A (1965) ("[O]ne who undertakes to render services
in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by
members of that profession or trade ....").It is noteworthy that this heightened standard of care applies
to both a "trade" as well as a "profession." This standard is thus applicable even if a broker is technically
deemed not a professional within a given jurisdiction. See Hilliard v. Black, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (N.D. Fla.
2000) (holding that broker may still be liable for negligence even though F.S.A. § 95.1 l(4)(a) defines
profession as a vocation requiring a four-year college degree); Kuntz v. Muehler, 603 N.W.2d 43, 46-47
(N.D. 1999) (holding that a financial planner is not a professional because financial planners are not required
to get a college degree, for the purposes of statute of limitations and reversing summary judgment to allow
negligence claim to go forward).
190. E.g., Fantini v. Alexander, 410 A.2d 1190, 1192 (NJ. App. 1980) (holding a karate instructor to
the industry standard of care).
191. E.g., Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1186 (Ill.
1993) (holding that an attorney malpractice
claim may be brought in contract or tort).
192. E.g., Grotto Pizza v. Endecon, Inc., No. 96C-01-031, 1997 Del. Super. LEXIS 100 (Del. Super.
Ct. Mar. 26, 1997).
193. Hermann v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 P.2d 817 (Wash. App. 1977)
(applying the continuous representation doctrine in an action for stockbroker negligence). Seealso Int'l
Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen & Co., 888 P.2d 1279, 1288-89 (Cal. 1995) (holding that in an accountant
malpractice claim alleging negligent preparation of tax return, the statute of limitations does not begin to
run until the IRS assesses a final deficiency); Morrison v. Watkins, 889 P.2d 140, 146 (Kan. App. 1995)
(holding that continuous representation of an attorney tolled the statute of limitations for an attorney
malpractice claim).
194. SeeWilliams v. Runion, 325 S.E.2d 441, 446 (Ga. App. 1984) (stating that reliance upon
professionals justified the denial of a directed verdict based upon comparative negligence); Erlich v. First
Nat'l Bank of Princeton, 505 A.2d 220, 240 (NJ. Super. 1984) (stating in an investment adviser malpractice
case that the "[p]laintifls negligence is less than that of defendants because defendants were the professionals
charged with the duty to give prudent [investment] advice").
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various jurisdictions.'95 While expert testimony is generally required to
establish the violation of industry standards, 96 the establishment of such
a violation is evidence that may support a jury finding of professional
negligence.9 7 Indeed, in the specific context of SRO rules, violations
have been found in the absence of a finding of scienter.'98
Predictably, some jurisdictions are more restrictive than others in
imposing the obligation of professional care.' Even in such jurisdictions, liability may well obtain under the industry standards imposed by
the SROs and the SEC.2"' The Restatement applies an identical
standard to skilled trades.20 ' Professional malpractice claims have both
a contractual and tort basis.2" 2 In the context of securities brokerage
accounts, every account has a customer account agreement, and this
agreement, being drafted by the broker, is to be strictly construed
against the broker.20 3 Moreover, every broker has an agreement with
an SRO.2" 4 These agreements necessarily are intended to benefit and
protect investors by imposing standards of high business ethics.2" 5 All of
these agreements are drafted by brokers and the brokerage industry and
ought to be construed strictly in favor of investors.206 Under these
principles, a breach of industry standards would be an actionable breach

195. E.g., Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So.2d 973, 982 (Ha. 1999) (holding that the economic loss
doctrine does not apply to professional malpractice claims).
196. SeeBoyle v. Welsh, 589 N.W.2d 118 (Neb. 1999) (requiring expert testimony in attorney
malpractice case); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985) (holding that a
structural engineer could establish the standards applicable to landscapers in building retaining wall); Cross
v. Huttenlocher, 440 A.2d 952, 954 (Conn. 1981) ("To prevail in a malpractice case the plaintiff must
establish through expert testimony both the standard of care and the fact that the defendant's conduct did

not measure up to that standard.").
197. E.g., McCann v. Davis, Maim & D'Agostine, 669 N.E.2d 1077, 1078 (Mass. 1996).
198. See,e.g.,Holland v. SEC, 105 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Erdos v. SEC, 742 F.2d 506, 508
(9th Cir. 1984).
199. Seecases cited supra note 189.
200. Id.
201. SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A supra note 189.
202. E!g., Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185 111.1992) (holding that professional malpractice may
be pursued as either a tort or contract claim).
203. E.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) (construing an
ambiguous account agreement against the broker).
204. Seesupra notes 97-98. Exchange rules constitute a contract between members and, as between
those members, have the force of law. With some qualifications, such rules also bind nonmembers who
employ members to execute their business. SeeBibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481, 489 (1893) (utilizing New York
Cotton Exchange rules and regulations); seegenerally CHARLES H. MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS
AND STOCK EXCHANGES AND OF COMMODITY BROKERS AND COMMODITY EXCHANGES 1-12 (1931).
205. Seesupra notes 97-98.
206. Supra note 203.
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of contract under either professional malpractice standards 2°7 or a thirdparty-beneficiary contract analysis. 0 8
The reluctance of Congress to federalize industry regulation and
create broad federal remedies should not act to blur what Congress did
achieve: 2 9 it mandated elevated standards of industry conduct and
professionalism that would have profound effect under existing state law
principles of negligence, professional liability, and contract, both in 1934
as well as under present state law. Thus far, only a few courts have
utilized the industry standards arising from mandatory self-regulation in
precisely this manner."' The next Part of this Article will show that this
approach to broker liability rests upon a sound policy basis: the need to
prevent economic disruptions associated with speculative bubbles.
IV. THE ECONOMIC RISKS OF CAVEATEMPTOR IN THE SECURITIES

PROFESSION
It is no accident that the '34 Act was promulgated in the aftermath of
the greatest economic catastrophe in U.S. history.21I The law and
207. Prior to the Supreme Court's application of the principle that contracts should be strictly
construed against the drafter in the specific context of the broker-customer relationship, some authorities
suggested that SRO rules were not necessarily incorporated into a customer-broker agreement. E.g., Smythe
v. Prescott, Merrill, Turben & Co., 252 N.E.2d 524 (Ohio 1969). Even in such jurisdictions, however, SRO
rules do support professional malpractice liability as evidence of the standard of care. E.g., Ferritto v. Olde
& Co., 577 N.E.2d 101, 104-106 (Ohio App. 1989). Also, when the broker-customer agreement provides
that SRO rules govern the relationship, the rules are deemed incorporated into the agreement and a
violation of the rules is a breach of contract. See
Brumm v. McDonald & Co., 603 N.E.2d 1141 (Ohio 1942).
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981) ("A promise in a contract creates a duty
in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary may
enforce the duty.").
209. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that private enforcement is "'a most effective
weapon"' in the enforcement of the federal securities laws and "'a necessary supplement' to government
enforcement. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (quotingJ.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
210. See
Twomey v. Mitchum,Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968).
211. National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the dislocation of
trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and adversely
affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and
sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by excessive speculation on such
exchanges and markets, and to meet such emergencies the Federal Government is put to such
great expense as to burden the national credit.
15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000). It is difficult to capture the trauma of The Great Depression. "Between September
1, 1929, and July 1, 1932, the value of all stocks listed on the [NYSE] shrank . . . 83 percent." JOEL
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET I (2d ed. 1995). During the Great Depression,
unemployment soared from 3.2% in 1929 to 25.2% in 1933 and remained above 10% until World War II.
Real Gross National Product plunged from $709.6 billion in 1929 to $498.5 billion in 1933. See
ROBERT
J. GORDON, MACROECONOMICS 190-94 (5th ed. 1989). Similarly, investor confidence was so low before
the enactment of the federal securities laws that the issuance of new corporate securities had plunged from
$9.4 billion in 1929 to $380 million in 1933. SeeI Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
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macroeconomics of the Act was patent: Roosevelt sought to place the
American capitalistic system upon a firmer legal and regulatory
foundation.212 Most urgently, Roosevelt sought to take positive action
to restore investor confidence and spur more investment transactions
leading to greater economic growth.2"' Since the Great Depression, the
legal foundation laid under the financial system has not cracked in any
significant way; instead, our nation has had more than sixty-five years
of largely uninterrupted economic growth. In light of this record of
success (and perhaps, more importantly, lack of failure), high standards
of professionalism in the securities brokerage industry must be considered fundamental to efficient capital markets. Recognition of professional liability for violation of these high standards of conduct would
serve to strengthen financial markets.
In addition to facilitating investment transactions, the '34 Act also
served to address the risks implicit in speculative bubbles.214 The central
lesson of the Great Depression was that a precipitous decline in stock
prices can have significant macroeconomic consequences, and that
215
excessive speculation can lead directly to severe economic disruptions.

REGULATION 216 (3d ed. 1998). This is the reason lawmakers pursued aggressive policies to restore investor
confidence, including enacting the federal securities laws.
212. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933) ("The purpose of the legislation ... is to protect the public with
the least possible interference to honest business.") (quoting message of President Roosevelt to Congress).
213. SeeI Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, supra note 21 , at 217 ("[1] ncreasing investor confidence
•.. may have important economic consequences. By reducing the perceived risk of corporate securities,
compulsory disclosure would tend to reduce the risk premia that issuers . . . would have to pay, thus
increasing the funds available for economic growth.").
214. There has been revealed, on the part of certain persons occupying high positions in the
banking and financial world, an attitude toward the interests committed to their charge
which is not in accordance with those high standards and ideals which the public had been
led to expect of them. There has also been revealed on the part of the general public a
tendency toward unintelligent and senseless speculation which, lending itself to exploitation
by high pressure selling methods and through the medium of marginal trading and some of
the other practices revealed in the investigation, has stimulated security values to unsound
levels from which they have inevitably receded with disastrous consequences to the whole
national economy.
STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION STUDY,'supra note 21, at 3.
215. Market fluctuations caused by the condition just outlined have repercussions which
extend far beyond the stock exchanges and the circle of individuals who trade in securities.
There is a relationship between fluctuations in the stock market and unsettlement in business
conditions, based on the fact that stock-exchange movements are apt to be regarded by both
business men and the general public as an indicator of underlying conditions. A violent fall
in the stock market consequently may lead business men to curtail commitments and
activities, thereby increasing unemployment, while on the other hand a sharp rise in the stock
market may lead to expansion of business activity beyond the bounds of sound economics.
Likewise, the stock market vitally affects credit, which in turn directly affects commercial
conditions. In part this is due to the practice of banks in making loans upon stock-market
collateral. In part it is due to the fact that institutions such as savings banks and insurance
companies hold as investments securities listed on the exchanges, and fluctuations in

HeinOnline -- 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 560 2001-2002

2002]

STOCKBROKER MALPRACTICE

561

16
Even today, prominent economists recognize that speculative bubbles
can have severe adverse impacts upon macroeconomic performance,
without fully understanding the relationship between fiscal policy,
monetary policy, and the negative effects of a burst asset bubble like
stock price swoons.217 While the link between a professionalized
securities industry and containment of speculative pressure seems sound
and has been assumed to be significant by both contemporary observers
and Congress in 1934, it is by no means definitively proven." 8
Nevertheless, it does seem to benefit from both a powerful logical
argument and the track record of American securities markets since

19 3 4 .29 Current conditions in the U.S. equity markets seem to illustrate

the point further. First, recently the United States saw a dramatic
expansion in the degree ofparticipation in the stock market generally.22 °
quotations affect the apparent financial soundness of these institutions. When these
considerations of general economic welfare are united to practices and methods which are
either unethical or unsound, or both, the country has seen the result- in a succession of
financial disasters whose consequences affect the whole Nation.
Id.
216. Although a speculative bubble is difficult to define precisely, it generally refers to a situation in
which prices greatly exceed the real economic value ofan asset group. In the context of stocks, for example,
policymakers have recognized that:
So far as possible, the aim should be to try to create a condition in which fluctuations in
security values more nearly approximate fluctuations in the position of the enterprise itself
and of general economic conditions-that is, tend to represent what is going on in the
business and in our economic life rather than mere speculative or "technical" conditions in
the market ....
Id. at 5.
217. See RobertJ. Samuelson, Into the Great Unknoum, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2001, at A29 (discussing
macroeconomic risks of speculative stock bubble); RobertJ. Samuelson, Canjapan Come Back, WASH. POST,
Mar. 28, 2001, at A23 (discussingJapan's "bubble economy" of the 1980s).
218, If you think of how persistently investors have been sold overvalued shares in recent
years, [one] might... agreed with a famous Wall Street bear in the 1920s,Jesse Livermore,
who described Wall Street as a "giant whorehouse", where brokers were "pimps" and stocks
"whores", and where customers queued to throw their money away. Plus [sic] change.
Of Pimps, Punters and Equities, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 2001, at 95, 96 (reviewing B. MARK SMITH,
TOWARD RATIONAL EXUBERANCE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN STOCK MARKET (200 I)).
219. Much debate surrounds the efficacy of the federal securities laws. Compare GeorgeJ. Stigler, Public
Regulationof the Securities Markets, 37J. BUS. 117, 124 (1964) ("[S]itudies suggest that the S.E.C. registration
requirements had no important effect on the quality of new securities sold to the public."), with Irwin Friend
& Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C Through a Glass
Darkly, 37J. BuS. 382, 389 (1964) ("We doubt that any
person reasonably well acquainted with the evolution of stock-market practices between the pre- and postS.E.C. periods could lament or underrate the success of the new legislation in eradicating many of [the]
weaknesses in our capital markets."). This Article posits that the period of 1935 (the first full year after the
enactment of the Exchange Act) to the present has been marked by steady economic growth with no severe
economic disruptions in part because of the enactment of the securities laws in general, and the
professionalization of the securities industry. See also Friend & Herman, supra, at 386 ("Stigler of course is
aware.., that since the advent of the S.E.C. the stockmarket has had no debacle corresponding to that in
the early 1930's ....).
220. See Carol Bertaut & Martha Starr-McCluer, Household Portfolios in the United States (Federal
Reserve Board of Governors working paper dated April 26, 2000) (showing that share ownership rocketed
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Second, stock prices ran up to historic highs in defiance of nearly all
professional assessments.22' Third, stock prices suffered a dramatic
depreciation after the bubble burst.222 Fourth, macroeconomic policy
makers seem to be quite challenged in assessing the degree of damage
done generally to the economy from the speculative excesses.223 A
fundamental erosion in the degree to which investment decisions were
professionally guided seems central to any explanation of how the
bubble developed.
John Maynard Keynes recognized, after the Great Depression, that
a gradual increase in the frequency of equity ownership is generally
accompanied by an increase in investors that have "no special knowledge .. .in the valuation of investments."' 224 This, in turn, can be
expected to increase price volatility as the "mass psychology of a large
225
number of ignorant individuals" begins to dominate the market.
Eventually, even professional investors begin to chase the market rather
than exert a rational influence on market prices.226 Keynes thus showed
how market professionals succumb to mass psychology, a phenomenon
that seems to have repeated itself more recently in the American stock
market. 227 However, the proposal for a more professionalized securities
brokerage industry would serve to stem "mass psychology" at the

from 31.6% of households in 1989 to 49% in 1998 and that percentage of household wealth in the stock
market went from 15% in 1983 to 35% in 1998) (on file with author).
221. Id.
222. "Since last March's peak, the market has lost about $4.9 trillion in value." Samuelson,Into the
Great Unknown, supra
note 217, at A29.
223. E.g., id.
As a result of falling share prices, the net worth of American households fell in 2000 for the
first time since records began 55 years ago. Lower share prices are denting confidence. In
a recent survey by the University of Michigan (carried out before the latest plunge in stocks),
two-thirds of respondents believed that the economy was already in recession. The challenge
for the Fed is to stabilise the economy without prompting suspicions that it is cutting interest
rates to bail out investors. The central bank is to be commended, therefore, for having the
nerve to cut interest rates by a bit less than the market was expecting this week, while making
it clear that it will cut further if the economy continues to weaken.
Can the World Escape Recession?, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 200 1, at 21.
Of particular concern to policymakers is the degree to which the American markets, and their historic
decline, is correlated to foreign markets. Dancing in Step, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 2001, at 90 ("The
correlation between changes in American and European share prices has risen from 0.4 in the mid-90s to
0.8 last year.").
224. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
153 (1936).
225. Id. at 154.
226. Id. at 154-55.
227. In early 2000, the success of the American stock market in generating superior returns had
become too seductive for professionals to resist. See Lauren R. Rublin, The Good Tunes Roll On: And Chances
are the Stock Market Will Enjoy Another Rewarding 1ear, BARRONS,Jan. 3, 2000, at 29 (stating that DowJones
97
Average soared 1 % and the NASDAQindex 907% in the last five years).
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source; professional brokers would be widely available to investors who
have "no 2special
knowledge" and "mass psychology" would be more
28

informed.

Nevertheless, many neoclassical economic theorists assume that
parties should enjoy freedom of contract to negotiate any fiduciary
duties as a matter of efficiency. 229 Commentators have generally
responded to this by pointing out that fiduciary duty is a concept
premised upon extra-contractual operation and the vindication of noncontractual values. 23° This Article seeks to demonstrate that mandatory
professional duties are more efficient than contract-based duties, in that
a lack of investor confidence in the fairness of the securities brokerage
industry leads to fewer investment transactions, not more.23 1 Congress
was faced with this scenario when it enacted the '34 Act.232 At that time,
greater freedom of contract had led directly to the near extinction of the
securities industry. 23" The empirical evidence therefore strongly suggests
that more wealth maximizing transactions will occur under a mandatory
professional standards regime.
Of course, in a context where a rule of law gives rise to more
economic growth in a relatively clear and ascertainable manner, any
neoclassical justification is beside the point.234 This is because neoclassical economic analysis assumes too much and posits benefits that are too

228. This assumes that the prospect of civil liability would induce brokers to take further steps in
dispensing prudent investment advice pursuant to the suitability doctrine, thereby stemming the urge to
chum. See supra notes 97-129.
229. This thinking has infected the approach of the courts to the issue of fiduciary duties in investment
related relationships. See Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d 367, 372 (7th Cir. 1978) ("To
make this defendant or any other broker the guardian of a customer ... would destroy an important part
of the marketplace.") (quoting Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 107,
113 (N.D. Ala. 1971)); Hohz v. Hilliard, I F. Supp. 2d 887, 897 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (holding no fiduciary duty
for account trustee to notify customer of adverse estate tax consequences because such "paternalistic
responsibilities" would add transaction costs to investment transactions). See also In re E. F. Hutton & Co.,
[1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at 89,334 (July 6, 1988) (Grundfest, Comm.,
dissenting).
230. E.g., Steven A. Ramire,., 77mChaos of 12 U.S. C Section 1821(k): CongressionalSubsidizing ofNegligent
Bank Directors and Officers?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 625, 682-88 (1996).
231. "New corporate securities-which had equaled ... $9.4 billion in 1929-had fallen to $644
million in 1932 ....
I LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 211, at 216.
232. Id.
233. Brokers simply had far fewer investment dollars to generate profits after the crash. The total loss
of securities value from 1929 to 1932 was $93 billion. Id. at 167.
234. The limits of microeconomic theory are well-recognized in both law and economics. Economists
have long struggled to explain the inability of welfare economics, i.e., Pareto Efficiency, with its general
equilibrium analysis, to explain macroeconomic phenomena such as large-scale unemployment, credit crises,
business-cycle fluctuations, or even wide-spread bank failures. Peter Howitt, Macroeconomics: Relations with
Microeconomics, reprinted in THE NEW PALGRAVE, THE WORLD OF ECONOMIcS 394 (J. Eatwell et al. eds.,
1991).
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theoretical-namely, mere efficiency.23
In essence, neoclassical
economic modeling requires profligate assumptions such as perfect
236
information, perfect mobility of resources, and zero transaction costs.
Under these assumptions, human beings, as rational maximizers, will
transact until resources are allocated to their most valuable use. 7
Consequently, either wealth or utility will be theoretically maximized.238
But that is it. Under those unrealistic assumptions, wealth or utility will
be maximized but not growth, jobs, or productivity. 239 Neoclassical
theory has never posited that efficiency leads to more240output or more
jobs or more of any other macroeconomic aggregate.
There are other non-economic reasons for imposing professional
standards upon the brokerage industry. Just as the social context of
1934 demanded political action to repair our economic system, the
social context of the twenty-first century presents a context that is at

235. Pareto Efficiency is defined as "[aln allocation of resources in which it is impossible by
reallocation to make some consumers better offwithout simultaneously making others worse off." RICHARD
G. LIPSEY & PETER O. STEINER, ECONOMICS 952 (6th ed. 1981).
236. A perfectly competitive economy achieves Pareto Efficiency.
EDWIN MANSFIELD,
MICROECONOMICS: THEORY ANDAPPLICATIONS.447 (4th ed. 1982) (stating that "a perfectly competitive
economy satisfies the three sets of conditions for welfare maximization"). A perfectly competitive economy
requires: (i) that the product of any one seller, in a given market, is the same as all other sellers, i.e.,
homogeneity; (ii) that no market participant has sufficient power to affect price--all market participants are
price takers; (iii) that all resources are perfectly mobile; and (iv) that all market participants have perfect
knowledge of relevant economic data. Id. at 248-49. Note that Pareto Efficiency is not the same as saying
that maximum GNP has been achieved. Allan M. Feldman, Welfare Economics, reprinted in THE NEW
PALGRAVE, THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS 715 (J. Eatwell et al. eds., 1991). Some commentators, in
recognition of the rather prodigious assumptions of microcconomics, have sought shelter in other, more
obscure, definitions of efficiency, such as "KaldorHicks" efficiency. Id. at 14. Changing the definition of
efficiency from Pareto Efficiency, however, serves only to weaken the utility of the analysis; only Pareto
Efficiency theoretically supports welfare maximization and general equilibrium. Also, Kaldor's work has
been shown to be internally inconsistent. See Feldman, supra, at 720; see alsoJules L. Coleman, Effcieny,
Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 519-20, 527 (1980) ("Unlike happiness or wellbeing, wealth is not something of intrinsic value.").
237. Microcconomic theory hinges upon Pareto Efficiency, because only that concept is
theoretically consistent with welfare maximization. Welfare maximization, or general
equilibrium, is the microeconomic analysis which hypothesizes that all resources are
optimally allocated. Microeconomic modeling and analysis can, therefore, only address the
concept of Pareto Efficiency and not which standard will give rise to a maximum level of
GNP.
Ramirez, supra note 230, at 683-84.
238. Even Judge Posner has come around to recognizing that human beings are not rational
maximizers. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 419 (1995).
239. For example, as Judge Posner candidly admits, efficiency is not about "mysterious macroeconomic phenomena" such as "inflation unemployment [or] business cycles." RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1, at 3 (5th ed. 1998).
240. Id.
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" ' First, the breadth of securities ownership now is
least as compelling.24
2
42
greater than ever. Broadening securities ownership is certain to result
in a higher percentage of inexperienced, unsophisticated, and less
educated securities owners than if ownership were largely limited to a
small class of society.243 Second, an age crisis is looming in America and
abroad. Right now, more Americans than ever are depending upon the
securities markets to deliver returns sufficient to provide for
retirement.244 Experience has proven that unleashing a securities
industry dominated by a caveat emptor mentality upon less sophisticated
investors, who will be dependent upon securities markets for retirement,
will result in countless personal tragedies. 2 5 Examples of securities
professionals fleecing small investors abound.246

241. For example, in 1934, Congress recognized that the increasing breadth ofstock ownership in our
society meant that stock exchanges are "affected with a national public interest." S. REP. No. 73-1455, at
5(1934).
242. For example, from 1965 to 1997, the frequency of stock ownership rose from 10.4% of
3
Americans to 4 % of Americans. These investors frequently rely on such investments for their retirement
savings. SeePETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, A NATIONAL SURVEY AMONG STOCK INVESTORS,
CONDUCTED FOR THE NASDAQSTOCK MARKET (1997). Ironically, Congress recognized in 1934 that
broadening stock ownership presented increased risks to society and that unbridled access to stock markets
could cause economic instability. S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 5 (1934).
243. SeegenerallyJames A. Fanto, We're all Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, lrision and Regulation
of Investor Protection, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105 (1998).
244. Id. at 112-18.
245. As the SEC chairman has noted:
Take the sale of $8 billion oflimited partnerships during the 1980s by Prudential Securities.
Sadly, many people saving for retirement were misled about the risks of these investments.
The SEC, with the help of state regulators, investigated and reached a settlement with
Prudential at the end of last year, which has already returned almost $825 million to more
than 100,000 defrauded investors.
Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Speech to National Association of
Investors Corporation, Memphis, Tenn. (Aug. 27, 1995), available at 1995 WL 520185; seealso KURT
EICHENWALD, SERPENT ONTHEROCK 7 (1995) ("More than $8 billion worth of risky partnerships packaged
by Prudential-Bache collapsed after they had been falsely sold as safe and secure."); Chuck Hawkins, The
Mess at Poi-Bache: QuestionsAbout the Broker's Dealings Could Cause Long Tem Damage, BUS. WK. Mar. 4, 1991,
at 66 (stating that Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. sold more than $6 billion in limited partnerships to
100,000 investors who suffered huge losses without disclosing conflicts of interest or criminal convictions of
key promoters).
246. As stated in United States v. Mulkeren, 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991):
In the late 1980's a wide prosecutorial net was cast upon Wall Street. Along with the usual
flotsam and jetsam, the government's catch included some of Wall Street's biggest, brightest,
and now infamous-Ivan Boesky, Dennis Levine, Michael Milken, Robert Freeman, Martin
Siegel, Boyd L.Jeffries, and Paul A. Bilzerian-each ofwhom either pleaded guilty to or was
convicted of crimes involving illicit trading scandals.
Id. at 365; seealsoJAMES B. STEWART, DEN OFTHIEVES 535-36 (1991) (noting that Dennis Levine confessed
to $12.6 million in insider-trading profits, Ivan Bosky agreed to pay $100 million in sanctions, and Michael
Milken agreed to pay $600 million); Dennis B. Levine, The Inside Stoy ofAn Inside Trader, FORTUNE, May 2 1,
1990, at 80 (admitting that Dennis Levine "built $39,750 into $11.5 million" through seven weeks ofinsider
trading); The Insider-Trading Case's Cast of Characters, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1988, at E4 (detailing law
enforcement activity against the web of inside traders on Wall Street).
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The securities brokerage industry has also evolved in a manner that
supports industry standards of professional conduct. The reality facing
the industry today is that technology has progressed to a point where the
market price for a broker acting as mere order taker can achieve
revenue of about ten dollars per trade.247 The industry survives by its
ability to sell a bundle of services that at bottom consists of professional
services and professional advice; the technological reality of the year
2002 is that an investor can buy securities through a machine without
seeing or talking to a real person. - Under these circumstances, the
securities industry can hardly tolerate a public profile akin to used car
salespersons. Indeed, the ability of any broker-dealer to sell its professional services is compromised every time an investor is victimized by a
competitor that fails to adhere to professional standards.248 Under these
circumstances, strictly enforcing industry
norms of professionalism is
249
fundamental to commercial survival.

Securities markets should not be operated as if they are casinos. That
market is well occupied, and regulated broker-dealers are not well-suited
to hawking securities as games of chance. Similarly, banks, investment
companies, and insurance companies each sell investment products and
investment management services that compete with broker-dealers. But
brokers have the ability to offer a myriad of investment products in a
single account that is individually tailored and managed with professional advice and guidance. This is the market niche that allows brokerdealers to thrive in a market with revenues in excess of those available
to a mere order taker. It is particularly appropriate to impose professional standards upon market participants who hold themselves out to
the public,rleither through251advertising or service pricing, as "full-service"
securities professionals.
Put simply, this market niche must be
defended by limiting entry to true professionals.
The abolition of caveat emptor in the securities brokerage industry in
1934 was the appropriate response to the Great Depression. From
virtually any analysis, further erosion of the abolition of caveat emptor is
not appropriate. The securities brokerage industry is central to investor
perspectives on securities markets. The efficiency of these markets,

247. Current advertised rates for mere order takers are down to eight dollars a trade. Valerie Leroux,
Discount Brokers Challenge Full Service Finns, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,Jan. 21, 2000, aisailable at 2000 WL

2717674.
248. See S. REP. No.75-1455, at 3 (1938) (stating that one purpose ofthe Maloney Act was "to protect
the "investor and the honest dealer alike from [the] dishonest and... submarginal element in the industry").
249, See H.R. REP. No. 73-1383,.at 3 (1934) (stating that unregulated exchanges can lead to "mad
booms" and "terrible depressions" and that the '34 Act seeks "to save not destroy stock markets and
business").
250. See, e.g., In re Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939); cases cited supra note 112.
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central to our economic system, is at stake if industry standards erode.
Caveat emptor is not a sustainable standard of business in the securities
brokerage industry in a modern capitalist system.2
V. CONCLUSION
For reasons that are not clear, there are few reported decisions
holding a securities broker to the standard of care to which virtually
every other trade or profession is held. From real estate brokers to
beauty shop owners and from landscaping companies to lawyers, courts
have insisted that professionals adhere to the standards of the industry
and exercise professional care. This standard of care is evidenced by
codes of conduct or codes of ethics, usually promulgated by the relevant
profession itself. In the securities industry, SROs like the NYSE and the
NASD have promulgated detailed codes of conduct specifically designed
by the industry to inculcate standards of "high honor" or "just and
equitable principles of trade" throughout the securities brokerage
industry. There is no good reason for courts to decline to hold the
industry to its own professional standards and thereby frustrate the
fundamental purpose of self-regulation-investor protection. The text
and legislative history of the '34 Act, on the other hand, furnish a sound
basis upon which a law of broker malpractice ought to be built. Indeed,
insulating the industry from such liability is ultimately destructive of the
very professional standards that the industry thrives upon.
Separate and apart from the question of why courts have largely
insulated brokers from legal principles that apply to virtually every other
skilled trade or profession is the question of the economic risks that such
legal machinations pose. Holding that the imposition of professional
duties only raises transaction costs misses several compelling economic
points. Speculative bubbles and unfair securities markets marked by
principles of caveat emptor instead of professionalism will devastate
investor confidence, as it has so dramatically in the past, and greatly
diminish transactions in securities regardless of costs. We as a society
already have "been there and done that" when it comes to caveat emptor
in the securities markets and have found that-regardless of any
efficiency justification-it is prone toward economic catastrophe. In
1933, just before the enactment of the federal securities laws, efficiency
offered little comfort to Wall Street in the midst of an eighty-three
percent decline in share prices. In the final analysis, the economic
foundations of raising industry conduct to instill investor confidence was

251. Supra notes 1, 10, and 30.
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sound policy in 1934 and it is sound policy today. Courts should
recognize professional liability in the securities brokerage industry as a
means of reversing recent judicial hesitancy to hold brokers to the
standards of professionalism that those brokers hold out to the public.
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